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RIEMANNIAN GAME DYNAMICS
PANAYOTIS MERTIKOPOULOS∗ AND WILLIAM H. SANDHOLM§
Abstract. We study a class of evolutionary game dynamics under which the
population state moves in the direction that agrees most closely with current
payoffs. This agreement is defined by means of a Riemannian metric which
imposes a geometric structure on the set of population states. By supplying
microfoundations for our dynamics, we show that the choice of geometry pro-
vides a state-dependent but payoff-independent specification of the saliences
of and similarities between available strategies. The replicator dynamics and
the (Euclidean) projection dynamics are the archetypal examples of this class.
Similarly to these representative dynamics, all Riemannian game dynamics
satisfy certain basic desiderata, including positive correlation and global con-
vergence in potential games. Moreover, when the underlying Riemannian met-
ric satisfies a Hessian integrability condition, the resulting dynamics preserve
many further properties of the replicator and projection dynamics. We exam-
ine the close connections between Hessian game dynamics and reinforcement
learning in normal form games, extending and elucidating a well-known link
between the replicator dynamics and exponential reinforcement learning.
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1. Introduction
Viewed abstractly, evolutionary game dynamics assign to every population game
a dynamical system on the game’s set of population states. Under most dynamics,
the vector of motion at a given population state depends only on payoffs and behav-
ior at that state, so that changes in aggregate behavior are determined by current
strategic conditions. Such dynamics can thus be construed as state-dependent
rules for transforming current payoffs into feasible vectors of motion. To pro-
vide game-theoretic interpretations, one then considers individual choice protocols
which, when aggregated over the population, yield the dynamics in question.
This paper introduces Riemannian game dynamics, a class of dynamics under
which the state of the population tracks the feasible direction of motion that is
most closely aligned with the population’s current payoffs. Every member of this
class is generated by a Riemannian metric: a state-dependent inner product on the
positive orthant which is used to evaluate displacements from each point, thereby
inducing a geometric structure on the simplex.1 We provide an interpretation of
this structure as a state-dependent – but payoff-independent – specification of the
saliences of and similarities between the available strategies, properties that may
reflect the nature of the strategies themselves, the context in which the game is
played, or the way that agents reevaluate their choices. This structure is then
combined with payoff data to determine how the population evolves over time.
The two archetypal examples of this class are derived from particularly simple
structures. First, the replicator dynamics (Taylor and Jonker, 1978) are derived
from the so-called Shahshahani metric (Shahshahani, 1979) which sets a strategy’s
salience equal to its popularity. Second, the Euclidean projection dynamics (Nagur-
ney and Zhang, 1997) are obtained from the usual Euclidean metric, which fixes all
saliences at one. In both cases, similarities between pairs of different strategies are
zero. Other Riemannian metrics can be used in applications where different strate-
gies have clear affinities, allowing the presence and performance of one strategy to
positively influence the use of similar alternatives.
In Sections 3 and 4, we introduce the machinery from differential geometry
needed to construct our dynamics, using the replicator and Euclidean projection
dynamics as motivating examples. This construction involves two core steps: a
dual-to-primal conversion, and a projection to an admissible direction of motion.
The key ideas behind each of these steps are explained below.
Regarding the first step, differential geometry makes a basic distinction between
vectors, representing displacements from a given point, and covectors, which act
as linear functionals on vectors. Our starting point here is the observation that
payoffs at a population state x should be regarded as the components of a covec-
tor, an observation we justify by examining the role of payoffs in a variety of basic
game-theoretic definitions (Section 3.2). As such, the first step in constructing our
game dynamics is to convert payoff covectors to vectors – that is, to an object rep-
resenting a displacement from the current state. Each Riemannian metric provides
a canonical, state-dependent way of performing this conversion.
Second, the resulting vector must be projected to obtain the closest “admissible”
direction of motion, where the notion of closeness is again provided by the under-
lying Riemannian metric. In the interior of the simplex, all tangent directions are
1To be clear, a Riemannian metric is not a metric in the sense of measuring distances between
points in a metric space, but it induces such a distance function in a canonical way (Lee, 1997).
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admissible; at non-interior states however, the definition of “admissible” depends
on the behavior of the Riemannian metric near the boundary of the simplex.
As we explain in Section 3.4, the metric’s boundary behavior is the source of a
fundamental dichotomy that is best explained by looking at our two prototypical
examples. Under the replicator dynamics (i) the law of motion for every game is
continuous; (ii) the support of the population state remains constant along every
solution trajectory; and (iii) the dynamics’ rest points are the restricted equilibria
of the game – the states at which all strategies in use earn the same payoff. In
contrast, under the Euclidean projection dynamics (i) the law of motion is typically
discontinuous at the boundary of the simplex; (ii) the support of the state may
change repeatedly along a single solution trajectory; and (iii) the dynamics’ rest
points are the Nash equilibria of the underlying game. Based on this behavior, we
obtain a natural classification between continuous and discontinuous Riemannian
dynamics, each category sharing the boundary behavior of its prototype.2
A basic aim of our analysis is to demonstrate that many basic properties of
the replicator and Euclidean projection dynamics extend to our substantially more
general setting. To start, we show that several microfoundations for these baseline
dynamics can be adapted to more general Riemannian dynamics (Section 4.4).
These microfoundations are specified by means of revision protocols, which describe
the rates of switching between pairs of strategies, and yield the dynamics in question
when aggregated over the population.3 A key property of the revision protocols
used here is that the assignment of revision opportunities and the selection of new
strategies are influenced by the Riemannian metric in a symmetric way. The form
that this influence takes is determined by the choice of the metric, which specifies
the saliences of and similarities between strategies at each state.4
In Section 5, we show that Riemannian dynamics satisfy the basic desiderata for
evolutionary game dynamics: they heed a payoff monotonicity condition known as
positive correlation, and they converge to rest points in potential games.5 In the lat-
ter context, Riemannian dynamics also provide a broad generalization of Kimura’s
maximum principle (Kimura, 1958; Shahshahani, 1979). This principle states that,
when agents are matched to play a common interest game, the replicator dynamics
move in the direction of maximal increase in average payoffs, provided that lengths
and angles of displacement vectors are evaluated using the Shahshahani metric.
Extending this principle in two directions, we observe that in potential games, Rie-
mannian dynamics track the direction of maximum increase in potential, assuming
that displacements from each state are evaluated using the specified Riemannian
metric.
2Discontinuous dynamics do not seem well-suited for describing behavior in naturally occur-
ring environments. However, given that they do not decelerate near the boundary of the state
space, and in particular can converge to equilibrium in finite time, they seem particularly apt
for applications to engineering and decentralized control, in which the revision protocols of the
components of the controlled system are chosen by the system designer. For a recent survey, see
Marden and Shamma (2015).
3For microfoundations of the replicator dynamics, see Björnerstedt and Weibull (1996),
Weibull (1995), Helbing (1992), and Schlag (1998); for the projection dynamics, see Lahkar and
Sandholm (2008) and Sandholm et al. (2008). For surveys, see Sandholm (2010c, 2015).
4Sethi (1998) is an early work that emphasizes how intrinsic relationships between strategies
may influence evolutionary dynamics.
5Our convergence analysis requires a new technical result on Lyapunov functions for discon-
tinuous dynamics; for a precise statement, see App. B.
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Obtaining further results on stability, convergence, and global behavior requires
additional structure on our dynamics – and hence on the underlying Riemannian
metric. This structure is provided by an integrability condition. In prior work on
game dynamics, such conditions have been imposed on the vector fields used to
convert the strategies’ payoffs into vectors of choice probabilities.6 By contrast, the
integrability condition employed here is imposed on the matrix field that defines
a Riemannian metric,7 requiring that it be expressible as the Hessian of a convex
function. We call this function the potential of the metric, and we refer to the
resulting dynamics as Hessian game dynamics.8 Both the replicator dynamics and
the Euclidean projection dynamics are members of this class. Moreover, Hessian
dynamics are continuous when their potential function becomes infinitely steep
at the boundary of the simplex; accordingly, a version of this criterion separates
Hessian dynamics into a continuous and a discontinuous regime.
We analyze Hessian game dynamics in Section 6. The key tool we employ is
the Bregman divergence of the metric’s potential (Bregman, 1967), an asymmet-
ric measure of the “remoteness” of a given population state from any fixed target
state.9 By using the Bregman divergence as a Lyapunov function, we prove global
convergence to Nash equilibrium in strictly contractive games and local stability
of evolutionarily stable states under Hessian game dynamics.10 We also show that
certain distinctive properties of the replicator dynamics in normal form games –
specifically, the convergence of the time averages of interior solutions to Nash equi-
libria, and the existence of simple sufficient conditions for permanence – extend to
all continuous Hessian dynamics. Finally, we show that strictly dominated strate-
gies are eliminated under continuous Hessian dynamics, a conclusion which does
not extend to the discontinuous regime.11
Related work. There are very close connections between the dynamics considered
here and the dynamics studied by Hofbauer and Sigmund (1990), Hopkins (1999),
and Harper (2011). In order to have the machinery in place to make these connec-
tions clear, we postpone this discussion until Section 2.3.
There is a more surprising connection between Hessian game dynamics and mod-
els of reinforcement learning in normal form games. Rustichini (1999), Hofbauer
et al. (2009) and Mertikopoulos and Moustakas (2010) show that if players track
the cumulative payoffs (or scores) of their strategies, and they then choose mixed
6See Hart and Mas-Colell (2001), Hofbauer and Sandholm (2007), and Sandholm (2010a).
7Since a Riemannian metric is a state-dependent inner product, it can be represented as a
field of symmetric positive-definite matrices; for a detailed discussion, see Section 3.1.
8In the context of convex programming, gradient flows generated by Hessian Riemannian (HR)
metrics of this sort have been explored at depth by Bolte and Teboulle (2003) and Alvarez et al.
(2004). Laraki and Mertikopoulos (2015) examine the long-term rationality properties of a class of
second-order, inertial game dynamics derived from HR metrics; the Hessian dynamics considered
here can be seen as a first-order analogue of their dynamics.
9In the case of the Shahshahani metric, the Bregman divergence corresponds to the Kull-
back–Leibler divergence, whose usefulness in the analysis of the replicator dynamics is well known
(Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Weibull, 1995).
10For continuous Hessian dynamics like the replicator dynamics, “global” should actually be
read as “almost global”; see Section 6.2 for an exact statement.
11See Sandholm et al. (2008) and cf. Section 6.4.
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strategies at each instant by applying the logit choice rule to these scores, the evo-
lution of mixed strategies is described by the replicator dynamics.12 Combining
our analysis here with that in a companion paper (Mertikopoulos and Sandholm,
2016), we show that the Hessian dynamics derived from a steep potential func-
tion h also describe the evolution of mixed strategies under reinforcement learning
with penalty function h. In addition to substantially generalizing existing results,
our analysis provides an intuitive explanation for the tight links between the two
sorts of processes. Section 7 describes these and other connections between Hessian
dynamics and reinforcement learning in detail.
2. Population games and evolutionary dynamics
Notation. Let A = {α1, . . . , αn} be a finite set. The real space spanned by A
will be denoted by RA and we will write δαβ for the Kronecker deltas on A. The
nonnegative orthant of RA will be denoted by K ≡ RA+ and the set of vectors whose
components sum to zero will be written RA0 = {z ∈ RA :
∑
α zα = 0}. Finally, in a
slight abuse of notation, we will write Rsupp(x) = {z ∈ RA : zα = 0 whenever xα =
0} for the set of vectors whose supports are contained in the support of x ∈ RA.
2.1. Population games. Throughout this paper we focus on games played by a
population of nonatomic agents.13 During play, each agent chooses an action (or
pure strategy) from a finite setA, and his payoff is determined by his choice of action
and by the proportions xα ∈ [0, 1] of the population playing each action α ∈ A.
Collectively, these proportions define a population state x = (xα)α∈A ∈ RA; hence,
the set of population states (or state space) is X = ∆(A) = {z ∈ RA+ :
∑
α xα = 1}.
The payoff to an agent playing α ∈ A when the population state is x ∈ X is then
given by an associated payoff function vα : X → R which we assume to be Lipschitz
continuous. Putting all this together, a population game may be identified with a set
of actions and their associated payoff functions, and will be denoted by G ≡ G(A, v).
A population state x∗ ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium of a game G if
vα(x
∗) ≥ vβ(x∗) for all α ∈ supp(x∗) and for all β ∈ A. (NE)
If x∗ is pure (i.e. x∗ = eα for some α ∈ A) and satisfies (NE), it is called a pure
Nash equilibrium of G; if, in addition, (NE) is strict for all β /∈ supp(x∗), x∗ is said
to be a strict equilibrium of G.
A restriction of a game G is a population game G′ ≡ G′(A′, v′) that is defined by a
subset A′ ⊆ A of the original game’s action set and by payoff functions vα obtained
by restricting the original payoff functions to the reduced state space X ′ = ∆(A′)
of G′. If x ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium of some restriction of G, it will be called a
restricted equilibrium; put differently, x ∈ X is a restricted equilibrium of G if all
strategies in the support of x earn equal payoffs.
Below we introduce some classes of population games that have been studied
extensively. The first is the focus of the early literature on evolutionary game
dynamics (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Weibull, 1995):
Example 2.1 (Matching in normal form games). The simplest example of a pop-
ulation game is obtained by uniformly matching a population of agents to play a
12See Börgers and Sarin (1997), Posch (1997), and Hopkins (2002) for related results.
13Except when noted otherwise, our analysis extends to the multi-population setting without
significant effort.
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two-player symmetric normal form game with payoff matrix A = (Aαβ)nα,β=1. Ag-
gregating over all matches, the payoff to an α-strategist when the population is at
state x ∈ X is vα(x) =
∑
β∈AAαβxβ . Thus, uniform random matching generates
payoff functions that are linear in the population state.
The next two classes of games have a wide variety of applications, and their
Nash equilibria are the only stable limit points of a wide variety of evolutionary
dynamics (Sandholm, 2010c).
Example 2.2 (Potential games). A population game G is called a potential game
(Sandholm, 2001, 2009) if there exists a potential function f defined on a neighbor-
hood of X such that:14
∂f
∂xα
= vα(x) for all α ∈ A and for all x ∈ X . (2.1)
Potential games include congestion games, games generated by variable pricing
schemes, and population games generated by random matching in common interest
games (Aαβ = Aβα).
Example 2.3 (Contractive games). A population game G is called (weakly) contrac-
tive (Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2009) if∑
α
(vα(x
′)− vα(x))(x′α − xα) ≤ 0 for all x, x′ ∈ X . (2.2)
If (2.2) binds only when x = x′, G is called strictly contractive; at the other end of
the spectrum, if (2.2) binds for all x, x′ ∈ X , G is called conservative.15 Contractive
games include wars of attrition, nonatomic congestion games with increasing cost
functions, and games that admit a concave potential. Random matching in normal
form games with an interior evolutionarily stable state generates strictly contractive
population games (see Section 6.2), while random matching in symmetric zero-sum
games (Aαβ = −Aβα) generates conservative population games.
2.2. Evolutionary dynamics and their microfoundations. Evolutionary dy-
namics are rules that assign to each population game G a dynamical system on the
state space X of G. This is usually done by mapping each game to a differential
equation of the form:
x˙ = V (x). (D)
In most cases, the vector field V (x) is defined by introducing a map (x, pi) 7→ V˜ (x, pi)
from state/payoff pairs to vectors, and then specifying that V (x) ≡ V˜ (x, v(x)). In
what follows, we will focus exclusively on this class of dynamics.
Now, to ensure that solutions to (D) remain in X for all t ≥ 0, V (x) should not
point outward from X ; more formally, V (x) should lie in the tangent cone of X at
x, defined as
TCX (x) = {z ∈ RA0 : zα ≥ 0 whenever xα = 0}. (2.3)
Under many evolutionary dynamics (including the replicator dynamics and other
imitative dynamics), the support of x(t) remains invariant under (D); put differ-
ently, the (relative) interior of each face of X is invariant under (D). When this is
14For most purposes, it suffices for f to be defined on X and to ask that the directional
derivative Dzf(x) be equal
∑
α vα(x)zα for all z ∈ RA0 and for all x ∈ X – see Sandholm (2009).
15Hofbauer and Sandholm (2009) use the name stable games, but Sandholm (2015) proselytizes
for the terms employed here. In convex analysis, (2.2) is called monotonicity.
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the case, V (x) actually lies in the tangent space to X at x, defined as
TX (x) = {z ∈ RA0 : zα = 0 whenever xα = 0} ⊆ TCX (x). (2.4)
Clearly, for interior states x ∈ X ◦ ≡ rel int(X ), we have TX (x) = TCX (x) = RA0 .
A basic monotonicity criterion linking the dynamics x˙ = V (x) with the under-
lying game requires positive correlation between the strategies’ payoffs and growth
rates; formally, this means that∑
α
vα(x)Vα(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X , (PC)
with equality only if V (x) = 0. If (D) satisfies (PC), every Nash equilibrium of G
is a rest point of (D). For a detailed discussion, see Sandholm (2010c).
To provide microfoundations for (D), one specifies a revision process which in-
duces (D) in the so-called “mean field” limit. Formally, such processes can be
described by means of a revision protocol which specifies the unconditional switch
rates sαβ(x, pi) at which α-strategists switch to strategy β given the current pop-
ulation state x and payoffs pi (= v(x)). It is sometimes useful to think of these
switch rates as taking the product form
sαβ(x, pi) = pα(x, pi) rαβ(x, pi), (2.5)
where pα(x, pi) describes the rate at which revision opportunities are assigned to
α-strategists, and rαβ(x, pi) is the rate at which α-strategists switch to β when
receiving a revision opportunity.16
Together, a population game G ≡ G(A, v) and a revision protocol s induce the
following mean dynamics
x˙α =
∑
β
(sβα(x, v(x))− sαβ(x, v(x))) , (MD)
which describe the rate of change in the use of each strategy α as the difference
between inflows into α from other strategies and outflows from α to other strategies.
For a fixed protocol s, (MD) can be viewed as a map from population games to
differential equations on X , as discussed earlier in this section.17
Example 2.4 (The replicator dynamics). The quintessential evolutionary game dy-
namics are the replicator dynamics of Taylor and Jonker (1978), defined as
x˙α = xα
[
vα(x)−
∑
β
xβvβ(x)
]
. (RD)
Under (RD), the percentage growth rate of a strategy currently in use is equal to
the difference between its payoff and the population’s average payoff; moreover,
strategies that are initially unused remain so for all time.
16In the standard formulation of revision protocols (Sandholm, 2010b,c), agents are assigned
revision opportunities uniformly at random, so an α-strategist receives the next opportunity with
probability xα, and a revising α-strategist switches to β at conditional switch rate ραβ(x, pi).
The advantage of this way of presenting microfoundations is its focus on individual agents rather
than on the groups of agents playing each strategy. For present purposes, the advantage of the
formulation used here is that it expresses the symmetries that define Riemannian dynamics most
directly (Section 4.4). One can convert this formulation into the standard one using the identity
ραβ(x, pi) ≡ sαβ(x, pi)/xα. (Note also that it is not necessary to define ραβ(x, pi) when xα = 0.)
17Solutions to (MD) can be viewed as approximations to the sample paths of stochastic evo-
lutionary models generated by the protocol s and game G: see Kurtz (1970), Benaïm (1998),
Benaïm and Weibull (2003), and Roth and Sandholm (2013).
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There are three well-known protocols that provide microfoundations for the repli-
cator dynamics:
sαβ(x, pi) = xαxβpiβ , (2.6a)
sαβ(x, pi) = −xαxβpiα, (2.6b)
sαβ(x, pi) = xαxβ [piβ − piα]+ , (2.6c)
with pi assumed nonnegative in (2.6a) and nonpositive in (2.6b).18 Under all pro-
tocols (2.6), the group of α-strategists receives revision opportunities at rate xα,
and the rate at which strategy β is chosen as the candidate replacement strategy
is xβ . A simple interpretation is that revising agents are selected uniformly at ran-
dom from the population, and they likewise select a candidate strategy by choosing
another agent at random from the population. The protocols differ in how payoffs
determine the rate at which these switches are consummated: in (2.6a), this rate
grows linearly in the payoff of the candidate strategy; in (2.6b) it decreases lin-
early in the payoff of the revising agent’s original strategy; and in (2.6c) it grows
linearly in the excess payoff of the sampled strategy versus that of the incumbent.
Substituting any of these protocols into (MD) and rearranging the result yields the
replicator dynamics (RD).
Example 2.5 (The Euclidean projection dynamics). The other fundamental example
we consider is the Euclidean projection dynamics of Nagurney and Zhang (1997)
(see also Friedman, 1991, and Lahkar and Sandholm, 2008). On the interior of X ,
these dynamics are defined as
x˙α = vα(x)− 1|A|
∑
β∈A
vβ(x), (2.7)
so a strategy’s absolute growth rate equals the difference between its payoff and
the unweighted average of all strategies’ payoffs. Geometrically, the right-hand side
of (2.7) is the Euclidean projection of payoffs onto RA0 , the tangent space to X at
interior points. On the other hand, on the boundary of the simplex, the dynamics
are defined via closest point projections to the tangent cone TCX (x) of X ; we detail
this construction in Section 4.2.
Sandholm et al. (2008) observed that, on the interior of X , the following ana-
logues of protocols (2.6a)–(2.6c) provide microfoundations for the Euclidean pro-
jection dynamics:
sαβ(x, pi) =
1
|A|piβ , (2.8a)
sαβ(x, v) = − 1|A|piα, (2.8b)
sαβ(x, pi) =
1
|A| [piβ − piα]+ , (2.8c)
with pi assumed nonnegative in (2.8a) and nonpositive in (2.8b). The dependence
on payoffs in these protocols is the same as in (2.6), but here neither the rate
that a strategy is assigned a revision opportunity nor the rate at which a strategy
becomes the candidate depends on the current state. The former independence
can be interpreted as “insecurity”: each α-strategist reconsiders his strategy at a
rate inversely proportional to the strategy’s popularity xα so the aggregate rate of
18Protocols (2.6a) and (2.6b) are due to Björnerstedt and Weibull (1996) and Weibull (1995),
and protocol (2.6c) is due to Helbing (1992) and Schlag (1998).
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revision by α-strategists is constant. The latter independence can be interpreted as
agents randomly choosing a candidate strategy from a list of all strategies, without
regard for the strategy’s popularity.19
2.3. Antecedents. The class of dynamics studied in this paper is a substantial
generalization of both the replicator dynamics and of the Euclidean projection
dynamics. We now describe works from an assortment of fields that are antecedents
of our approach.
The replicator equation (RD) for common interest games is a basic model from
population genetics (see Schuster and Sigmund, 1983). The fundamental theorem of
natural selection, attributed to Fisher (1930), states that natural selection among
genes increases overall population fitness. Kimura (1958) introduced a correspond-
ing maximum principle, showing that population fitness increases at a maximum
rate under (RD), provided that one imposes a certain nonlinear constraint on the
set of feasible changes in population frequencies. Later, Shahshahani (1979) (see
also Akin, 1979) put Kimura’s maximum principle on a firm mathematical footing
using tools from differential geometry – specifically, by introducing a suitable Rie-
mannian metric. The replicator dynamics and the Shahshahani metric both play a
key role in what follows.
Hofbauer and Sigmund (1990) model natural selection in populations of animals
whose traits are represented by elements of a continuous set. They assume that
all members of the population share the same trait x, except for an infinitesimal
group of mutants whose traits differ infinitesimally from x. The evolution of the
preponderant trait x follows a gradient-like process, moving in the direction that
agrees with the play of the most successful local mutants. To obtain variations on
this process, Hofbauer and Sigmund (1990) use Riemannian metrics to define the
size and shape of the neighborhood of local mutants. When the trait space is X
and the fitness of mutant y takes the linear form
∑
α yαvα(x), they showed that
the evolution of x on the interior of X is given by
x˙α =
∑
β∈A
[
g−1αβ (x)−
∑
γ g
−1
αγ (x)
∑
γ g
−1
γβ (x)∑
γ,κ g
−1
γκ (x)
]
vβ(x), (2.9)
where g(x) is a field of symmetric positive definite matrices that defines the Rie-
mannian metric in question (see Section 3.1). Hofbauer and Sigmund (1990) then
observed that under the Shahshahani metric, equation (2.9) becomes the replica-
tor equation (RD). As we shall see, (2.9) describes the dynamics studied in this
paper at all interior states, and also at boundary states in what we will call the
minimal-rank case (cf. Section 3.4).
In the course of analyzing perturbed best response dynamics (Fudenberg and
Levine, 1998) and variants of fictitious play (Brown, 1949, 1951), Hopkins (1999)
introduced a class of game dynamics that are defined on the interior of X as
x˙α =
∑
β∈A
Mαβ(x)vβ(x), (2.10)
where M(x) is a smoothly-varying field of symmetric matrices that are positive
definite on RA0 and map constant vectors to 0. Hopkins (1999) showed that the
19At boundary states, the protocols must be altered to recover the projection onto the tangent
cones TCX (x); see Sandholm et al. (2008) and Example 3.15 below.
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linearization of these dynamics agrees with that of perturbed best response dynam-
ics up to a positive affine transformation, implying that the local stability of rest
points of (2.10) agrees with that of the corresponding rest points of perturbed best
response dynamics with sufficiently small noise levels. As we show in Appendix
A.1, the dynamics (2.9) satisfy Hopkins’ conditions, and, conversely, any dynamics
satisfying Hopkins’ conditions can be expressed in the form (2.9). Thus, on the in-
terior of X , the dynamics of Hopkins (1999) are equivalent to the dynamics studied
here (Proposition A.3).
Finally, Harper (2011) uses ideas from information geometry to define general-
izations of the replicator dynamics, and introduces Riemannian metrics to state
and prove certain properties of the induced dynamics. Ignoring boundary issues,
Harper’s dynamics are an important special case of ours – specifically, the class of
separable dynamics that we introduce in Example 4.6.
In this paper, we develop a unifying mathematical framework for all of the fore-
going dynamics, provide them with microfoundations, and substantially generalize
a variety of stability and convergence results known for various specific cases.
3. Geometric preliminaries
The main goal of Riemannian geometry is to study the concepts of distance,
length and curvature on “manifolds” – that is, topological spaces that locally look
like vector spaces. Here we briefly introduce some basic ideas from Riemannian
geometry needed to define the class of dynamics under study. For a comprehensive
introduction, we refer the reader to the masterful account of Lee (1997, 2003).
3.1. Riemannian metrics and associated notions. The most basic notion in
Riemannian geometry is that of a Riemannian metric, a position-dependent variant
of the ordinary (Euclidean) scalar product between vectors. To define it, recall first
that a scalar product on a finite-dimensional real space W (henceforward referred
to as the model space) is a bilinear pairing 〈·, ·〉 : W ×W → R which satisfies the
following conditions for all w,w′ ∈W :
(1) Symmetry: 〈w,w′〉 = 〈w′, w〉.
(2) Positive-definiteness: 〈w,w〉 ≥ 0, with equality if and only if w = 0.
The norm of a vector w ∈W is then defined as
‖w‖ = 〈w,w〉1/2. (3.1)
To express the above in components, take W = RA as the model space and
let {eα}α∈A be the canonical basis of W . Then, if we write w =
∑
α wαeα and
w′ =
∑
w′βeβ , the bilinearity of 〈·, ·〉 implies that
〈w,w′〉 =
∑
α
∑
β
wαgαβw
′
β (3.2)
for some symmetric positive-definite matrix g = (gαβ)α,β∈A. This matrix is called
the metric tensor of 〈·, ·〉, and its components (also known as the metric elements
of g) are given by
gαβ = 〈eα, eβ〉. (3.3)
A scalar product is uniquely defined by its metric tensor and vice versa, so the two
notions will be used interchangeably throughout.
Now, given an open subset U of W and a base point x ∈ U , let Wx = {(x,w) :
w ∈W} denote the space of displacement (or tangent) vectors “attached” to x; more
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(b) Shahshahani unit balls
Figure 1. Unit balls on the positive orthant of R2 under the Euclidean
and Shahshahani metrics. For each base point x shown, the shaded
regions comprise all tangent vectors w based at x that satisfy ‖w‖x ≤ 1
(scaled down for illustration). For large values of x1/x2, Shahshahani
balls appear as ellipsoids that are elongated along e1 (and vice versa for
small values of x1/x2).
formally, we refer to the pair (x,w) ∈Wx as w based at x. A Riemannian metric on
U is then defined as a C1-smooth assignment of scalar products 〈·, ·〉x (and hence
norms ‖·‖x) to each Wx – or, equivalently, as a C1 field g(x) of symmetric positive
definite matrices on U .
In words, a Riemannian metric on U prescribes a way of measuring lengths of
tangent vectors at each point x ∈ U .20 To build intuition, we proceed with two key
examples, takingW = RA as the model space and using its standard basis {eα}α∈A
for coordinate calculations.
Example 3.1. The Euclidean metric on U = RA is defined as
gαβ(x) = δαβ for all x ∈ U, (3.4)
so g(x) = δ is simply the identity matrix. This definition yields the standard
expressions 〈w,w′〉x =
∑
α wαw
′
α and ‖w‖x =
(∑
α w
2
α
)1/2, both independent of x.
Example 3.2. For a less trivial example, let U = K◦ be the open positive orthant
of RA. Then the Shahshahani metric on U is defined as:
gαβ(x) = δαβ/xβ for all x ∈ U. (3.5)
Eq. (3.5) yields the Shahshahani inner product 〈w,w′〉x =
∑
α wαw
′
α/xα, which,
in contrast to the Euclidean product, is x-dependent. For instance, since ‖eα‖x =
20In the pair (x,w), x simply acts as a base point label for w ∈W ; apart from that,Wx inherits
the vector space structure of the model space W . In view of the natural isomorphism (x,w) 7→ w
from Wx to W , we will use the same notation for W and its “tagged” variant Wx unless there is
danger of confusion. In the same spirit, we will also write, e.g., ‖w‖x in place of ‖(x,w)‖x.
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(a) Euclidean unit balls
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(b) Shahshahani unit balls
Figure 2. Unit balls on the 3-simplex.
x
−1/2
α , the sphere of vectors at x with (Shahshahani) norm 1 is squeezed toward
the xα axis as xα → 0 (cf. Figs. 1 and 2).
The metrics in the previous examples were defined on open sets U containing
the positive orthant K◦ ≡ RA++; the latter may be viewed as a set of generalized
population states whose total masses may differ from 1. In order to define our class
of game dynamics, we will extend these definitions and related constructions to the
entire closed orthant K = cl(K◦) = RA+ (Sec. 3.4), and then adapt the results to
objects defined on the simplex X = ∆(A) ⊆ K (Sec. 3.5).
3.2. Duality: payoffs as covectors. A linear functional ω : W → R acting on
vectors w ∈ W is called a covector, and the space W ∗ of such functionals is called
the dual space of W . We use the notation 〈ω|w〉 to denote the action of a covector
ω ∈W ∗ on a vector w ∈W ; to emphasize this pairing, the elements of W and W ∗
are also referred to as primal and dual vectors respectively.
Taking W = RA as the model space, the standard (primal) basis {eα}α∈A of
W induces a corresponding dual basis {εα}α∈A via the identity 〈εα|eβ〉 = δαβ . In
this context, we can easily distinguish between vectors and covectors using matrix
notation: primal vectors w =
∑
α wαeα ∈W correspond to column vectors, whereas
dual vectors ω =
∑
α ωαεα ∈ W ∗ correspond to row vectors. From this point of
view, the action 〈ω|w〉 of ω on w is just the matrix product ω w = ∑α ωαwα.
This brings us to the point of departure for our game-theoretic analysis: in
many contexts, payoff “vectors” naturally act as linear functionals on displacement
vectors, and so should be regarded as covectors.21 We illustrate this point through
four examples below:
Example 3.3. The definition (NE) of Nash equilibrium can be written equivalently
as ∑
α
vα(x
∗)(xα − x∗α) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ X , (3.6)
21Although this distinction is rarely made in evolutionary game theory, it is standard in learning
and optimization theory; see Nemirovski and Yudin (1983), Shalev-Shwartz (2011), and references
therein.
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or, in primal-dual (vector-covector) notation,
〈v(x∗)|x− x∗〉 ≤ 0 for all x ∈ X . (3.7)
Since the displacement vector z = x − x∗ is tangent to X , (3.7) only restricts the
action of payoff covectors on the tangent hyperplane RA0 = {z ∈ RA :
∑
α zα = 0}.
From a game-theoretic standpoint, this reflects the fact that Nash equilibria are
not affected if payoffs to all strategies are shifted by the same amount.
Example 3.4. The defining property (2.1) of potential games can be expressed as
〈df(x)|z〉 = 〈v(x)|z〉 for all z ∈ RA and all x ∈ X . (3.8)
On the left hand side, df(x) denotes the differential of f at x, a linear functional
that acts on tangent vectors z ∈ RA to yield the directional derivative Dzf(x).
Thus, (3.8) can be expressed as an equality between covectors: v(x) = df(x).22
Example 3.5. In defining contractive games, we can highlight the duality between
payoffs and displacements in X by rewriting (2.2) as
〈v(x′)− v(x)|x′ − x〉 ≤ 0 for all x, x′ ∈ X . (3.9)
Since the vector x′ − x is tangent to the simplex, this definition only restricts the
action of v(x′) and v(x) on RA0 . As in Example 3.3 above, this is an algebraic
restatement of the fact that contractiveness is not affected by uniform payoff shifts.
Example 3.6. Finally, the positive correlation condition (PC) can be written as:
〈v(x)|V (x)〉 ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X , (3.10)
with equality only when V (x) = 0. Again, the vector of motion V (x) must be
tangent to X at x, so (3.10) only restricts the action of v(x) on RA0 .
3.3. Primal equivalents: representing payoffs as vectors. Our aim in this
paper is to study evolutionary dynamics whose vectors of motion V (x) respect
payoffs v(x) to the greatest possible extent. This raises our next key point: because
payoffs v(x) are covectors, the definition of such dynamics requires an operation
that translates covectors into vectors that represent displacements from the current
state.
To that end, let g be a Riemannian metric on an open subset U of W , and fix a
base point x ∈ U . The primal equivalent of a dual vector ω ∈ W ∗ at x ∈ U is the
(unique) primal vector ω] ∈W (pronounced “ω-sharp”) satisfying
〈ω|w〉 = 〈ω], w〉x for all w ∈W. (3.11)
In other words, the action of ω ∈ W ∗ on w ∈ W coincides with the scalar product
between ω] and w at x. For concision, the notation ω] suppresses the dependence
on x; when we want to emphasize this dependence, we will write g](x) : W ∗ → W
for the linear map ω 7→ ω] at x (cf. Eq. (3.12) and Footnote 23 below).
To express the above in components, let {eα}α∈A denote the standard basis of
the model space W = RA, and let ωα ≡ 〈ω|eα〉 be the α-th component of ω ∈W ∗.
Then, writing
ω]α =
∑
β
g]αβ(x)ωβ (3.12)
22The equality in (3.8) also characterizes potential games as defined in Footnote 14, with the
domain of f being the simplex X . In this case, the equality need only hold for vectors z ∈ RA0
that are tangent to X at x – that is, for vectors representing feasible changes in the population
state. Indeed, when f is only defined on X , the differential df(x) can only act on vectors in RA0 .
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for the α-th component of ω], the fundamental relation ωα = 〈ω|eα〉 = 〈ω], eα〉 =∑
β gαβ(x)ω
]
β readily yields
g]αβ(x) = g
−1
αβ (x), (3.13)
where g−1αβ (x) are the components of the inverse matrix g
−1(x) of g(x). Thus, in
matrix notation, g](x) is represented by g−1(x).23
Example 3.7. Since the Euclidean metric tensor has gαβ(x) = δαβ = g
]
αβ(x) for all
x ∈ RA, we get
ω]α = ωα for all α ∈ A. (3.14)
In other words, ω and ω] have the same coordinates in the standard basis of RA,
though ω should be treated as a row vector and ω] as a column vector.
Example 3.8. Since the Shahshahani metric tensor has gαβ(x) = δαβ/xβ for all
x ∈ RA++, we have g]αβ(x) = δαβxβ for its inverse; hence:
ω]α = xαωα for all α ∈ A. (3.15)
3.4. Extensions to boundary points. We now extend the constructions of the
previous sections to the orthant’s boundary, and thus to population states where
some actions are unused. For that, recall that K = RA+ denotes the non-negative
orthant of RA, and that K◦ = RA++ its interior. The tangent space TK(x) to K at
x ∈ K is the linear subspace
TK(x) = {z ∈ RA : zα = 0 whenever xα = 0} = Rsupp(x). (3.16)
With this background at hand, we introduce a number of definitions below. A
Riemannian metric g on K◦ is said to be extendable to K if the associated operator
g] admits a C1 extension to K (also denoted by g]) such that
TK(x) ⊆ im g](x) for all x ∈ K. (3.17)
In the above, im g](x) is the image (column space) of g](x); we henceforth call this
set the domain of g at x and denote it as dom g(x). If dom g(x) = RA for all x ∈ K,
we say that g is full-rank extendable; if instead dom g(x) = TK(x) for all x ∈ K, we
say that g is minimal-rank extendable.
Given our game-theoretic motivation, it is natural to define extendability in
terms of g], the operator that converts payoffs from covector form into vector form.
The implications for the underlying metric g are presented in the following propo-
sition (which we prove in Appendix C):
Proposition 3.9. Let g be an extendable Riemannian metric on K. Then, for all
x ∈ K, there exists a unique scalar product 〈·, ·〉x on dom g(x) such that 〈w,w′〉xk →〈w,w′〉x for all w,w′ ∈ dom g(x) and for every interior sequence xk → x. Moreover,
if g is minimal-rank extendable, we have g]αβ(x) = 0 whenever α, β /∈ supp(x).
Example 3.10. The Euclidean metric (3.4) is full-rank extendable by default: we
simply have g]αβ(x) = gαβ(x) = δαβ for all x ∈ K.
23 Note though that the sharp operation incorporates a transposition, converting row vectors
ω into column vectors ω] = (ωg](x))>.
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Example 3.11. The Shahshahani metric (3.5) has g]αβ(x) = xαδαβ , so dom g(x) =
TK(x) = Rsupp(x). Thus, the Shahshahani metric is minimal-rank extendable, and
for each x ∈ X , the induced scalar product on dom g(x) is
〈w,w′〉x =
∑
α∈supp(x) wαw
′
α/xα for all w,w
′ ∈ TK(x). (3.18)
Remark 3.12. In the minimal-rank case, the scalar product 〈·, ·〉x on dom g(x) can
be represented by the matrix g(x) = (g](x))+, the (Moore-Penrose) pseudoinverse
of g](x) (see Appendix A). This means that the submatrix (gαβ(x))α,β∈supp(x) is
the inverse of the submatrix (g]αβ(x))α,β∈supp(x), while the remaining components
of g(x) (which have no geometric significance) are set to 0.
Remark 3.13. The previous examples highlight an important dichotomy between
full-rank and minimal-rank extendability. In a certain sense, metrics that are full-
rank extendable to the closed orthant K do not differentiate between its interior and
its boundary. By contrast, minimal-rank extendable metrics partition K into the
relative interiors of each of its faces (including K itself), a distinction which plays a
key role in what follows. Specifically, when a minimal-rank extendable metric leads
to well-posed dynamics, the dynamics’ formula for the interior also works at the
boundary. This is not the case for full-rank extendable metrics.
Remark 3.14. Of course, there are Riemannian metrics whose extensions are of
neither full rank nor minimal rank. Such metrics are of limited interest for our
purposes so, in what follows, “extendable” will mean “full-rank or minimal-rank
extendable”.
3.5. Tangent projections. The first step in obtaining a dynamical system on X
from the game’s payoff covectors v(x) is to employ the sharp operation to turn
them into vectors v](x). Generally however, v](x) is not a feasible direction of
motion on X at x: its components may not sum to zero, and it may have negative
components for strategies that are not used at x. We thus need to project v](x)
onto the tangent cone TCX (x) to X at x; like the sharp operation, this projection
depends on the Riemannian metric g and, in particular, it may vary with x.
More precisely, for all x ∈ X and w ∈ dom g(x), the tangent projection of w at
x is defined as
Πx(w) = arg min{‖w − z‖x : z ∈ TCX (x) ∩ dom g(x)}. (3.19)
The feasible set TCX (x) ∩ dom g(x) of (3.19) consists of all tangent vectors w ∈
TCX (x) that also lie in the domain dom g(x) of g at x. We call such vectors
g-admissible, and we write
Admg(x) = TCX (x) ∩ dom g(x) (3.20)
for the cone of g-admissible tangent vectors at x.
The restrictions on w and z above are required because dom g(x) is the set
on which the norm ‖·‖x is defined. The only case in which dom g(x) is not all
of RA occurs when x ∈ bd(X ) and g is minimal-rank extendable; in this case,
dom g(x) = TX (x) = Rsupp(x), and v](x), the vector we will ultimately project, lies
in this set (since dom g(x) = im g](x) by definition).
Some instances of g-admissible cones are depicted in Figure 3. With this figure
as a point of reference, we examine (3.19) in detail in three exhaustive cases.
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(a) Euclidean boundary behavior.
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Admg(x)
(b) Shahshahani boundary behavior.
Figure 3. Admissible sets under the Euclidean and Shahshahani met-
rics. For x ∈ ∆◦, we have Admg(x) = TCX (x). For x ∈ bd(X ), we still
have Admg(x) = TCX (x) in the Euclidean case, but the Shahshahani
metric can only be extended to the tangent space Admg(x) = TX (x).
Interior points. If x ∈ X ◦ is interior, we have TCX (x) = TX (x) = RA0 and
dom g(x) = RA. Thus, the g-admissible set is the hyperplane
Admg(x) = RA0 ∩ RA = RA0 , (3.21)
and the tangent projection (3.19) is just the orthogonal projection of w ∈ dom g(x) =
RA onto RA0 . Accordingly, Πx(w) can be computed by finding a normal vector to
TCX (x) = RA0 and subtracting this vector’s contribution to w (as in the first step
of the Gram-Schmidt orthonormalization process).
To carry this out, let 1 = (1, . . . , 1), so 〈1|z〉 = ∑α zα = 0 for all z ∈ RA0 . If we
then let
n(x) ≡ 1] =
∑
α,β∈A
g]αβ(x)eβ , (3.22)
we obtain
〈n(x), z〉x = 〈1|z〉 = 0 for all z ∈ RA0 , (3.23)
i.e. n(x) is a normal vector to RA at x with respect to g (see Fig. 4). We may thus
express the tangent projection Πx(w) as
Πx(w) = w − projn(x) w = w −
〈n(x), w〉x
‖n(x)‖2x
n(x). (3.24)
Using (3.24) and the definition of n(x), we can write Πx(w) in coordinate form as
(Πx(w))α = wα −
∑
β wβ∑
β nβ(x)
nα(x), (3.25)
where nα(x) =
∑
β g
]
αβ(x) is the α-th component of the normal vector to X at x.
Boundary points: the minimal-rank case. Suppose that x ∈ bd(X ) and g is minimal-
rank extendable at x (as with the Shahshahani metric). Since TCX (x) = {z ∈
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(a) Euclidean unit normal vectors
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(b) Shahshahani unit normal vectors
Figure 4. Unit normal vectors to the simplex X under the Euclidean
and Shahshahani metrics. Unit normals are obtained by dividing n(x) =
1] by its norm ‖n(x)‖x. The shaded regions represent the metrics’ unit
balls at each base point (cf. Fig. 1).
RA0 : zα ≥ 0 if xα = 0} and dom g(x) = TK(x) = Rsupp(x), the corresponding
g-admissible set is
Admg(x) = TCX (x) ∩ TK(x) = RA0 ∩ Rsupp(x) = TX (x). (3.26)
The difference with the previous case is that dom g(x) is now Rsupp(x) rather than
the entire ambient space RA. Proceeding along the lines above, we observe that
n(x) lies in dom g(x) = Rsupp(x) and is normal to TX (x) = RA0 ∩ Rsupp(x). Thus
the argument leading to Eqs. (3.24) and (3.25) shows that the projection Πx(w) is
described by these same equations. The main novelty is that since both w and n(x)
lie in dom g(x) = Rsupp(x), wα and nα(x) both vanish in (3.24) and (3.25) when
α /∈ supp(x). This property will lead to simple expressions for our game dynamics
in minimal-rank cases.
Boundary points: the full-rank case. Finally, if x ∈ bd(X ) and g is full-rank ex-
tendable at x (as in the Euclidean case), we have dom g(x) = RA, and hence:
Admg(x) = TCX (x) = {z ∈ RA0 : zα ≥ 0 whenever xα = 0}. (3.27)
Since this g-admissible set is a proper cone (and not a linear subspace of RA),
obtaining an explicit expression for (3.19) requires solving a convex program whose
inequality constraints may be active.
Example 3.15. In the Euclidean case, we have Πx(w) = arg min{
∑
α∈A (zα − wα)2 :
z ∈ TCX (x)}. Since g]αβ = δαβ , it follows easily from (3.25) that
(Πx(w))α = wα − |A|−1
∑
β∈A wβ for all x ∈ X
◦. (3.28)
On the other hand, given that the Euclidean metric is full-rank extendable,
deriving Πx(w) for x ∈ bd(X ) requires solving a convex program. Doing so, Lahkar
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and Sandholm (2008) obtained the expression
(Πx(w))α =
{
wα − |A(x)|−1
∑
β∈A(x) wβ if α ∈ A(x),
0 otherwise,
(3.29)
where A(x) is a subset of A that maximizes the average |A′|−1∑β∈A′ vβ(x) over
all subsets A′ ⊂ A that contain supp(x) – cf. Lahkar and Sandholm (2008).
Example 3.16. Since the Shahshahani metric is minimal-rank extendable, tangent
projections are readily obtained from (3.25) for all x ∈ X . Indeed, since g]αβ(x) =
δαβxβ , we get n(x) = x (see Fig. 4), and hence:
(Πx(w))α = wα −
(∑
β
wβ
)
xα for all w ∈ dom g(x) = Rsupp(x). (3.30)
Note that (Πx(w))α = 0− 0 = 0 whenever α /∈ supp(x), as anticipated above.
4. Riemannian game dynamics
4.1. Definition and coordinate formulas. Given the geometric background of
the previous section, defining the class of game dynamics under study is straight-
forward. Specifically, let G ≡ G(A, v) be a population game with payoff functions
vα : X → R, α ∈ A, and let g be an extendable Riemannian metric on the positive
orthant K◦ ≡ RA++ of RA. Then, the Riemannian game dynamics induced by g are
x˙ = Πx(v
](x)), (RmD)
where v](x) is the primal equivalent of the payoff covector v(x) and Πx(v](x)) is
the tangent projection of v](x) at x – cf. Eqs. (3.11) and (3.19) respectively.
On the interior of X , a direct application of (3.25) yields the coordinate formula
x˙α = v
]
α(x)−
∑
γ v
]
γ(x)∑
γ nγ(x)
nα(x), (4.1a)
where v]α(x) =
∑
β g
]
αβ(x)vβ(x) and nα(x) =
∑
β g
]
αβ(x) is the α-th component of
the normal vector n(x) to X at x. Alternatively, rearranging (4.1a) lets us express
the dynamics as a linear function of the payoff covector v(x):
x˙α =
∑
β∈A
[
g]αβ(x)−
nα(x)nβ(x)∑
γ nγ(x)
]
vβ(x). (4.1b)
Equation A.3 in Appendix A provides a concise third expression for (RmD) on X ◦
in terms of a pseudoinverse matrix.
Two remarks are now in order. First, note that a state-dependent change of
speed converts the dynamics (4.1) into the pleasingly symmetric form
x˙α = v
]
α(x)
∑
γ
nγ(x)− nα(x)
∑
γ
v]γ(x). (4.2)
We will see that the microfoundations for (4.2) are particularly simple. Thus, given
that changes of speed do not affect the qualitative behavior of the dynamics, we
will move freely between (4.1) and (4.2) in what follows.24
Secondly, if g is minimal-rank extendable, (4.1) is still valid when x ∈ bd(X ) and
one can equally well take all sums in (4.1) only over the strategies in the support of
24 Note that (4.2) is a Riemannian system in its own right – simply take the rescaled metric
g˜(x) = g(x)/‖n(x)‖2 and apply (4.1) to g˜ instead of g.
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x.25 If instead g is full-rank extendable, computing (3.19) requires solving a convex
program (3.19) whose inequality constraints may be active; in that case, coordinate
formulas for (RmD) will depend on the support of x.
Because of this, (RmD) may fail to be continuous at the boundary of X . It will
thus be convenient to call those dynamics generated by minimal-rank extendable
metrics continuous Riemannian dynamics, and those generated by full-rank ex-
tendable metrics discontinuous Riemannian dynamics. Owing to their simplicity,
we present continuous dynamics before discontinuous ones in what follows.
4.2. Basic examples. We now verify that the two basic examples of dynamics
from Section 2 – the replicator dynamics and the projection dynamics – are induced
by the Riemannian metrics highlighted in Section 3.
Example 4.1 (The replicator dynamics). Let g be the Shahshahani metric, so
g]αβ(x) = δαβxβ , nα(x) = xα, and v
]
α(x) = xαvα(x). Then, (4.1) and (4.2) both
yield the continuous Riemannian dynamics
x˙α = xα
[
vα(x)−
∑
β
xβvβ(x)
]
. (RD)
Example 4.2 (The Euclidean projection dynamics). Let g be the Euclidean metric,
so g]αβ(x) = δαβ , nα(x) = 1, and v
]
α(x) = vα(x). Then, (3.29) and (RmD) yield the
(discontinuous) projection dynamics:
x˙α =
{
vα(x)− |A(x)|−1
∑
β∈A(x) vβ(x) if α ∈ A(x),
0 otherwise,
(PD)
where A(x) is defined as in Example 3.15. These dynamics were introduced by
Nagurney and Zhang (1997) and examined further by Lahkar and Sandholm, 2008
and Sandholm et al., 2008. The discontinuity of (PD) is reflected in the appearance
of the support of the state x in (PD) through the definition of A(x).
The dynamics (RD) and (PD) highlight an important qualitative difference be-
tween Shahshahani and Euclidean projections – and, more generally, between con-
tinuous and discontinuous Riemannian dynamics. The replicator dynamics (RD)
comprise a Lipschitz continuous dynamical system on X which preserves the face
structure of X (i.e. the relative interior of each face of X remains invariant). By
contrast, the projection dynamics (PD) may fail to be continuous at the boundary
of X so the relevant notion of a solution to (PD) is that of a Carathéodory solu-
tion (which allows for kinks at the boundary); moreover, solutions of (PD) may
leave and re-enter the relative interior of any face of X in perpetuity. Despite these
complications, we will show in Proposition 5.2 that (RmD) admits unique forward
solutions from every initial condition in X .
4.3. Invariances to payoff transformations. Riemannian game dynamics sat-
isfy two basic invariances: shifting all strategies’ payoffs by the same amount does
not affect the dynamics, and rescaling all strategies’ payoffs by the same factor only
changes the speed at which solution paths are traversed.
To state these invariances formally, fix a population game G ≡ G(A, v) with pay-
off functions vα : X → R and consider the linearly transformed game G˜ ≡ G˜(A, v˜)
25This is so because g]αβ(x) = 0 whenever α or β is not in supp(x) – see also Proposition 3.9
and the discussion following Eq. (3.26).
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with payoff functions v˜α(x) = a(x) + b(x)vα(x) for a pair of scalar functions
a : X → R and b : X → (0,∞) that represent a (state-dependent) shift and rescaling
of the original payoffs of G respectively. Then:
Proposition 4.3. With notation as above, Πx(v˜](x)) = b(x) Πx(v](x)). Conse-
quently, the solution orbits of (RmD) for G˜ coincide with those for G.
Proof. By definition, we have v˜](x) = a(x)n(x)+b(x)v](x). However, since 〈n(x), z〉 =
0 for all z ∈ Admg(x) = TCX (x) ∩ dom g(x), we also have
‖a(x)n(x) + b(x)v](x)− z‖2
= ‖b(x)v](x)− z‖2 + ‖a(x)n(x)‖2 + 2a(x)b(x)〈n(x), v](x)〉, (4.3)
so Πx(v˜](x)) = Πx(b(x)v](x)). Using the definition of Πx and the fact that b(x) > 0,
we then get
Πx
(
v˜](x)
)
= arg minz′‖b(x)v](x)− z′‖x = b(x) arg minz′‖v](x)− z′/b(x)‖x
= b(x) arg minz‖v](x)− z‖x = b(x) Πx
(
v](x)
)
. 
Remark 4.4. Continuous Riemannian dynamics satisfy a further invariance: on the
face of X that is spanned by a subset A′ of A, the dynamics are also invariant to
changes in the payoffs of strategies outside of A′. This follows directly from (RmD)
and the fact that v˜](x) = v](x) whenever supp(x) ⊆ A′ and v˜α(x) = vα(x) for all
α ∈ A′ (cf. Proposition 3.9).
4.4. Microfoundations. So far, the motivation behind (RmD) has been chiefly
geometric, inspired by certain fundamental properties of the replicator and projec-
tion dynamics. We now proceed by describing a class of strategy revision processes
that induce the Riemannian dynamics (RmD) in the cases where the coordinate
formulas (4.1) and (4.2) hold.26 Our constructions apply to metrics with nonneg-
ative g] so as to ensure that all switch rates are positive; also, as in Examples 2.4
and 2.5, we will sometimes assume that payoffs are nonnegative or nonpositive.
Since games that differ only by a payoff shift may be regarded as equivalent under
(RmD) by Proposition 4.3, these assumptions are innocuous. With this in mind,
we have:
Proposition 4.5. Let g be an extendable Riemannian metric such that g](x) is
nonnegative for all x ∈ X ◦. Then the following protocols generate (4.2) as their
mean dynamics on X ◦:
sαβ(x, pi) = (1g
](x))α (pig
](x))β , (4.4a)
sαβ(x, pi) = −(pig](x))α (1g](x))β , (4.4b)
where pi is assumed nonnegative in (4.4a) and nonpositive in (4.4b). If in addition
g(x) is diagonal, (4.2) is also generated by the protocol
sαβ(x, pi) = g
]
αα(x)g
]
ββ(x)[piβ − piα]+. (4.4c)
Proof. Substitute (4.4) in (MD) and recall that n(x) ≡ 1] = (1g](x))> and that
v](x) = (v(x)g](x))>. 
26Handling boundary states under full-rank extendable metrics requires modifications of the
sort noted in Lahkar and Sandholm (2008). We do not pursue this direction here.
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As an example, the revision protocols (2.6) that generate the replicator dynamics
are recovered from (4.4) when g is the Shahshahani metric; likewise, the protocols
(2.8) that generate the projection dynamics on X ◦ are recovered (up to renormal-
ization by |A|) when g is the Euclidean metric.
In view of Proposition 4.5, a Riemannian metric can be seen as a state-dependent
(but payoff-independent) measure of the salience of each strategy and the similari-
ties between strategies. Saliences are represented by the diagonal elements g]αα(x)
of g](x) and similarities by its off-diagonal elements g]αβ(x) = g
]
βα(x).
27 Under
(4.4), the salience of a strategy at a given state reflects the chance that it is con-
sidered for abandonment or adoption, while the similarity of a pair of strategies
indicates how the presence of one spurs the abandonment or adoption of the other.
The crucial feature of the protocols (4.4) is the symmetric influence of the matrix
g](x) on the assignment of revision opportunities to strategies and the selection of
new strategies. For instance, assignments of revision opportunities are determined
under (4.4a) by applying g](x) to the equal-rate covector 1, and selection of new
strategies by applying g](x) to the payoff covector v(x). Protocol (4.4b) reverses
the roles of the two covectors; but since payoffs now determine assignments, v(x)
is replaced by −v(x), so better-performing strategies receive revision opportunities
less often. Finally, when g](x) is diagonal (cf. Example 4.6 below), protocol (4.4c)
provides foundations for (RmD) based on pairwise comparisons of payoffs – again,
assignment and selection are influenced by g](x) symmetrically.
4.5. Further examples. To illustrate the scope of the class of dynamics under
study, and to interpret the microfoundations introduced in the previous section, we
provide some further examples below.
Example 4.6 (Separable metrics). A Riemannian metric g on K◦ is called separable
if its metric tensor is of the form
gαβ(x) = δαβ/φ(xβ), (4.5)
for some continuous weighting function φ : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) that is strictly positive
on (0,∞). We then get
g]αβ(x) = δαβφ(xβ), (4.6)
so g is minimal-rank extendable if limz→0+ φ(z) = 0 and full-rank extendable if not.
When the coordinate formulas (4.1) and (4.2) apply, the normalized dynamics
(4.2) induced by g take the simple form
x˙α = φ(xα)
vα(x) ∑
β∈A
φ(xβ)−
∑
β∈A
φ(xβ)vβ(x)
 . (4.7)
Taking φ(z) = z gives the Shahshahani metric and the replicator dynamics (RD),
while setting φ(z) = 1 yields the Euclidean metric and the projection dynamics
(PD). Ignoring the dynamics’ behavior at the boundary, the unnormalized version
of (4.7) was studied by Harper (2011) under the name escort replicator dynamics,
and was further examined by Mertikopoulos and Sandholm (2016) in the context
of reinforcement learning in games (see Section 7).
27It might be preferable to refer to the latter as “cosaliences”, reserving the term “similarities”
for the correlation coefficients ραβ(x) = g
]
αβ(x)/(g
]
αα(x)g
]
ββ(x))
1/2 ∈ [−1, 1].
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In view of Proposition 4.5, Eq. (4.6) implies that switch rates to and from strat-
egy α are affected only by the relevant population share xα; in the language of the
previous section, all pairs of distinct strategies have similarity zero. The degree
of influence generated by population share xα is described by the function φ. For
instance, when φ(z) = z switch rates between strategies are proportional to popu-
larity, while when φ(z) = 1 they are independent of popularity. We discuss a range
of other possibilities in Example 4.8 below.
Example 4.7 (Hessian Riemannian metrics and the induced dynamics). A general-
ization of the above class of examples can be obtained by considering Riemannian
metrics that are defined as the Hessians of convex functions.28 To make this precise,
let h : K → R be a continuous function on K such that (i) h is C3-smooth on every
positive suborthant of K; and (ii) Hessh(x) is positive-definite for all x ∈ K◦ (so,
in particular, h is strictly convex on K◦). Then, h induces a natural Riemannian
metric on K◦ defined as
g = Hessh, (4.8)
or, in components:
gαβ(x) =
∂2h(x)
∂xα∂xβ
. (4.9)
When this is the case, we will say that g is a Hessian Riemannian (HR) metric and
will refer to h as the potential of g. Clearly, every separable metric (4.5) is an HR
metric with potential function
h(x) =
∑
α∈A
θ(xα) (4.10)
for some smooth function θ : [0,+∞)→ R with 1/θ′′(z) = φ(z).
Definition (4.8) is an integrability condition on the matrix field g, thus justifying
the terminology “potential” for h (though, of course, g is a matrix field, not a
vector field). As with vector fields on convex sets, integrability of matrix fields can
be characterized by a symmetry condition on its derivatives, namely that29
∂gαγ
∂xβ
=
∂gβγ
∂xα
for all α, β, γ ∈ A. (4.11)
Equation (4.11) is an integrability condition on matrix fields. It thus differs fun-
damentally from integrability conditions appearing in previous work on game dy-
namics, which are imposed on vector fields that are used to define the dynamics.30
In Section 6, we will see that this integrability property provides important
theoretical tools for the analysis of the resulting Riemannian dynamics
x˙ = Πx(v
](x)), g = Hessh, (HD)
which we call Hessian dynamics.
28For the origins of the idea in a differential-geometric setting, see Shima (1977), Duistermaat
(2001), and references therein; for further applications to convex programming, see Bolte and
Teboulle (2003) and Alvarez et al. (2004).
29This characterization follows from the integrability condition for ordinary vector fields (i.e.
symmetry of the Jacobian matrix), and the symmetry of g(x) – or alternatively, through an easy
application of Poincaré’s lemma (see Alvarez et al. (2004)).
30Specifically, these vector fields take the (normalized) current payoffs of all strategies as inputs,
and return (unnormalized) vectors of choice probabilities as outputs—see Hart and Mas-Colell
(2001), Hofbauer and Sandholm (2009), and Sandholm (2010a, 2014).
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p name regularity potential
0 projection discontinuous quadratic
(0, 1) —— not Lipschitz power law
1 replicator smooth Gibbs entropy
(1, 2) —— smooth Tsallis entropy
2 log-barrier smooth logarithmic
(2,∞) —— smooth inverse power law
Table 1. Regularity of the p-replicator dynamics and behavior of the
generating potential function hp.
Example 4.8 (The p-replicator dynamics). Given p ≥ 0, we define the p-replicator
dynamics as the Riemannian dynamics induced by the separable metric gαβ(x) =
δαβ/x
p
β (corresponding to the monomial weighting function φ(z) = z
p in the par-
lance of Example 4.6). For p 6= 1, 2, these dynamics are generated by the potential
hp(x) =
∑
α∈A
θp(xα) with θp(z) = 1(p−1)(p−2)z
2−p. (4.12)
There are three values of p worth highlighting, including p ∈ {1, 2}:31
(1) For p = 0, we get the quadratic potential h0(x) = 12
∑
α x
2
α, which generates
the projection dynamics (PD).
(2) For p = 1, a direct integration yields the entropic potential h1(x) =∑
α xα log xα, which generates the replicator dynamics (RD).
(3) For p = 2, a direct integration yields the logarithmic potential h2(x) =
−∑α log xα, which generates the log-barrier dynamics
x˙α = x
2
α
(
vα(x)−
∑
β x
2
βvβ(x)∑
β x
2
β
)
, (LD)
a dynamics first examined by Bayer and Lagarias (1989) in the context of
convex programming.
The special cases above induce a natural partition of the class in six cases, as
summarized in Table 1.32 We should note that when p ≥ 2, hp becomes infinite on
the boundary ofK, violating a standing assumption; we will address this technicality
in Section 6.
The value of p describes the degree to which a strategy’s popularity hastens
switches to and from that strategy. This is illustrated in Figure 5, which presents a
31It is possible to define the potential hp for all values of p using a single formula. Let θp(z) =
(z2−p + p(p− 2)z − (p− 1)2)/((p− 1)(p− 2)) when p 6= {1, 2}, and define θ1 and θ2 by analytic
continuation. Linear and constant terms do not affect the resulting metric, and the explicit
formulas for θ1 and θ2 follow from the fact that lima→0(za − 1)/a = log z.
32The (negative) Tsallis entropy (Tsallis, 1988) mentioned in Table 1 is defined as Sq(x) =
(q − 1)−1∑α(xqα − xα) for some q ∈ (0, 1). To agree with this definition, it is sometimes more
convenient to use the parameter q = 2 − p instead of p; for the benefits of this convention, see
Harper (2011) and Mertikopoulos and Sandholm (2016).
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collection of p-replicator phase portraits for different choices of p in a Rock-Paper-
Scissors game with payoff matrix
A =
 0 −1 11 0 −1
−1 1 0
 . (4.13)
When p = 0, switch rates have no direct dependence on the current state, so the
dynamics are determined solely by payoffs. Thus the circular form of the payoffs
(4.13) generates circular closed orbits, subject to feasibility constraints (Fig. 5(a)).
As p increases, the role of strategies’ popularities in determining switching rates
becomes more important relative to their payoffs (Figs. 5(b) and 5(c)). When p is
large, popular strategies are far more likely to be considered for abandonment and
selection than less popular ones. Since switches involve a pair of distinct strategies,
switches between the two most popular strategies are far more likely to occur than
any others, with the direction of the switch determined by payoffs. This leads the
closed orbits to take a nearly triangular form (Fig. 5(d)).33
Figure 5 also illustrates a basic dichotomy between continuous and discontinuous
Riemannian dynamics. In the discontinuous case p = 0, there is a unique forward
solution from every initial condition in X ; however, solutions may enter and leave
the boundary of X , and solutions from different initial conditions can merge in
finite time. In the smooth regime (p ≥ 1), solutions exist and are unique in forward
and backward time, and the support of the state remains fixed along each solution
trajectory. Existence and uniqueness of solutions is treated formally in Section 5.1.
5. General properties
In the following sections we present our main results for (RmD). In Section 5.1
we state a basic but technically challenging result on the existence and uniqueness
of solutions. In Section 5.2, we show that the dynamics exhibit positive correlation
with the game’s payoffs, and we characterize the dynamics’ rest points as either
restricted equilibria or Nash equilibria. Finally, in Section 5.3 we study the global
behavior of the dynamics in potential games.
5.1. Existence and uniqueness of solutions. To illustrate the possibilities for
existence and uniqueness of solutions, it is useful to start with a simple example.
Example 5.1. We consider the p-replicator dynamics of Example 4.8 for a 2-strategy
game with action set A = {1, 2} and payoff functions v1(x) = 1, v2(x) = 0.
When p = 1, we obtain the toy replicator equation
x˙1 = x1(1− x1). (5.1)
Solutions to this equation exist and are unique for all t ∈ (−∞,∞), and the support
of x(t) is invariant. States 0 and 1 are rest points, and it is easy to check that the
unique solution with initial condition x1(0) = a ∈ (0, 1) is x1(t) = a/[a+(1−a)e−t].
When p = 0, we obtain the Euclidean projection dynamics
x˙1 =
{
1/2 if x1 < 1
0 if x1 = 1.
(5.2)
33That all of these dynamics feature closed orbits is not coincidental – see Proposition 6.6.
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(a) p = 0 (Euclidean projection).
R
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(b) p = 1 (replicator).
R
P S
(c) p = 3/2.
R
P S
(d) p = 5.
Figure 5. Phase portraits of the p-replicator dynamics in standard
Rock-Paper-Scissors. As p ∈ [0,∞) increases, the shape of the closed
orbits changes from circular to triangular. When p = 0, solutions enter
and leave the boundary of the simplex, but forward solutions exist and
are unique. For p ≥ 1, forward and backward solutions exist, are unique,
and their support is constant.
For every initial condition x1(0) ∈ [0, 1], this equation admits the unique forward
solution x1(t) = x1(0) + t/2 for t ∈ [0, 2) and x1(t) = 1 thereafter. Evidently, the
support of x(t) is not invariant; also, backward solutions are not defined for all
time, and solutions are not smooth in t when x1 = 1 is reached.
Finally, when p = 1/2, we obtain the differential equation
x˙1 =
√
x1(1− x1)√
x1 +
√
1− x1
. (5.3)
Although this equation admits forward (and backward) solutions from every initial
condition, these are no longer unique. From the initial condition x1(0) = 0, there
is the stationary solution x1(t) = 0 for t ∈ [0,∞). However, one can verify by
a direct – if tedious – calculation that there is another solution, namely x1(t) =
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1
2 +
t−2
4
√
1 + t− t2/4 for t ∈ [0, 4) and x1(t) = 4 thereafter. Additional solutions
may linger at x1 = 0 before emulating the previous solution trajectory.
The differences in behavior in the three cases above can be traced back to the
properties of the underlying Riemannian metrics. First, the replicator dynamics are
generated by the Shahshahani metric, which is minimal-rank extendable to all of
X . In this case the induced dynamics (RmD) are Lipschitz continuous, so existence
and uniqueness of solutions is guaranteed by the Picard–Lindelöf theorem (along
with an argument to account for X being closed). Moreover, the support of x(t) is
constant, and solutions exist in both forward and backward time (Sandholm, 2010c,
Theorems 4.A.5 and 5.4.7).
On the other hand, the Euclidean projection dynamics (PD) are generated by
a full-rank extendable metric. In such cases, the induced dynamics (RmD) are
typically discontinuous, so the relevant solution notion is that of a Carathéodory
solution, an absolutely continuous trajectory that satisfies (RmD) for almost all
t ≥ 0. In the case of (PD), Lahkar and Sandholm (2008) show that every initial
condition admits a unique Carathéodory solution; however, different solution orbits
can merge in finite time, as illustrated in the previous example and in Figure 5(a).
The following proposition shows that the behavior of (RD) and (PD) is repre-
sentative of the minimal-rank and full-rank extendable cases, respectively:
Proposition 5.2. Let g be an extendable Riemannian metric.
(i) If g is minimal-rank extendable, (RmD) admits a unique global solution from
every initial condition in X ; moreover, each solution has constant support.
(ii) If g is full-rank extendable, (RmD) admits a unique forward Carathéodory
solution from every initial condition in X .
Proposition 5.2 justifies the terminology continuous and discontinuous that we
introduced in Section 4.1 to refer to dynamics induced by minimal-rank and full-
rank metrics. The nontrivial part of Proposition 5.2 is the proof of part (ii): despite
an apparent similarity, this result is considerably harder than the corresponding
result of Lahkar and Sandholm (2008) for (PD), so we relegate its proof to Appendix
C. The main reason for this difficulty is that known uniqueness proofs for projected
differential equations depend crucially on the Riemannian metric being constant
throughout the dynamics’ state space, an assumption that obviously fails here.
Finally, as can be seen from the continuous – but not Lipschitz continuous –
system (5.3), (RmD) may fail to admit unique solutions from initial conditions at
the boundary of X if the underlying metric does not admit a Lipschitz continuous
extension to the boundary of X . To avoid the resulting complications, we will not
treat such pathologies in the rest of our paper.34
5.2. Basic properties. We now establish some basic relationships between (RmD)
and the payoffs of the underlying game. We first show that (RmD) respects the
payoff monotonicity condition (PC):
Proposition 5.3. The dynamics (RmD) satisfy positive correlation (PC).
34While our definitions of Riemannian metrics and extendability require g to be C1, nearly
all of our results can be proved under the weaker assumption that g is Lipschitz continuous.
The exception to this is the uniqueness claim of Proposition 5.2(ii), the proof of which uses the
smoothness of g in an essential way.
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Proof. Let V (x) = Πx(v](x)). We then claim that
〈v(x)|V (x)〉 = 〈v](x), V (x)〉x ≥ 〈Πx(v](x)), V (x)〉x = ‖V (x)‖2x ≥ 0, (5.4)
with equality if and only if V (x) = 0.
The only step in (5.4) needing justification is the first inequality. To that end,
we split the analysis into three cases corresponding to those from the definition of
Πx (see Section 3.5). First, if x ∈ X ◦, the inequality binds because Πx projects
RA onto RA0 = Admg(x), which contains V (x). Secondly, if x ∈ bd(X ) and g is
minimal-rank extendable, then v](x) ∈ Rsupp(x), so the inequality binds because
Πx projects Rsupp(x) orthogonally onto RA0 ∩ Rsupp(x) = Admg(x), which contains
V (x). Finally, if x ∈ bd(X ) and g is full-rank extendable, Πx is the closest point
projection of RA onto the tangent cone TCX (x). Hence, Moreau’s decomposition
theorem (Hiriart-Urruty and Lemaréchal, 2001) implies that v](x)−Πx(v](x)) lies
in the normal cone
NCX (x) = {w ∈ RA : 〈w, z〉x ≤ 0 for all z ∈ TCX (x)}. (5.5)
Since V (x) ∈ Admg(x) = TCX (x), the first inequality in (5.4) is immediate. 
Proposition 5.3 is not particularly surprising: after all, the basic postulate be-
hind (RmD) is that the dynamics’ vector field of motion is the closest feasible
approximation to the game’s payoff field, with the notion of closeness determined
by the underlying Riemannian metric. As we show below, this alignment can be
exploited further to characterize the dynamics’ rest points.
To make this precise, recall first that one of the main attributes of the Euclidean
projection dynamics (PD) is Nash stationarity :
x∗ ∈ X is a rest point if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium. (NS)
This property does not hold under the replicator dynamics: for instance, every pure
state of X is stationary under (RD). In this case, (NS) is replaced by restricted
stationarity :35
x∗ ∈ X is a rest point if and only if it is a restricted equilibrium. (RS)
Our next result shows that this difference between the projection and the repli-
cator dynamics is representative of the discontinuous and continuous cases, and
shows one advantage of the former over the latter:
Proposition 5.4.
(i) Continuous Riemannian dynamics satisfy (RS).
(ii) Discontinuous Riemannian dynamics satisfy (NS).
Proof. For (i), recall that the coordinate expression (4.1) for (RmD) always holds
when g is minimal-rank extendable, and x˙α = 0 whenever xα = 0. Therefore, it
suffices to check that x∗ ∈ X ◦ is a rest point if and only if v(x∗) ∝ 1. To that end,
note first that x∗ is a rest point of (4.1) if and only if
v](x∗) =
∑
γ v
]
γ(x
∗)∑
γ nγ(x
∗)
n(x∗) ∝ n(x∗). (5.6)
In turn, this means that x∗ is a rest point of (RmD) if and only if v](x∗) ∝ n(x∗) =
1]; our claim then follows from the fact that g](x∗) is invertible.
35Recall here that x∗ is a restricted equilibrium if all strategies in its support earn equal payoffs.
28 P. MERTIKOPOULOS AND W. H. SANDHOLM
For (ii), assume that g if full-rank extendable and fix some x∗ ∈ X . By the
variational characterization (3.7) of Nash equilibria, x∗ is a Nash equilibrium if and
only if
0 ≤ 〈v(x∗)|x− x∗〉 = 〈v](x∗), x− x∗〉x∗ for all x ∈ X , (5.7)
i.e. if and only if v](x∗) lies in the normal cone NCX (x∗) of X at x∗ (cf. Eq. 5.5
above). Moreau’s decomposition theorem then yields v](x∗) ∈ NCX (x∗) if and only
if Πx∗(v](x∗)) = 0, so our assertion follows. 
5.3. Global convergence in potential games. Recall that a game G ≡ G(A, v)
is a potential game if vα(x) = ∂αf(x) for some potential function f on X . It then
follows from Proposition 5.3 that f is a strict global Lyapunov function for (RmD),
meaning that its value increases along (RmD) whenever the dynamics are not at
rest.36
For continuous Riemannian dynamics, a standard Lyapunov argument implies
that all ω-limit points of (RmD) are rest points – and hence, by Proposition 5.4,
restricted equilibria of G. However, this argument does not extend to discontinuous
dynamics and Nash equilibria because it requires continuity of solutions with respect
to initial conditions, a requirement which is difficult to establish in our case. To
circumvent this obstacle, we establish below a lower semi-continuous (l.s.c.) bound
on the rate of change of the potential function. In turn, this allows us to apply
Proposition B.1 in Appendix B, which shows that, for dynamics on a compact
set, such a bound on the rate of change of a Lyapunov function guarantees global
convergence.
Proposition 5.5. Let G be a potential game with potential function f ; then, f is
a strict Lyapunov function for (RmD), and every ω-limit point of (RmD) is a rest
point of (RmD). These are restricted equilibria if (RmD) is continuous, and Nash
equilibria if (RmD) is discontinuous.
Proof. Let V (x) = Πx(v](x)) and let {x(t)} be a solution of (RmD). Then, Propo-
sition 5.3 yields
d
dt
f(x(t)) = 〈df(x(t))|x˙(t)〉 = 〈v(x(t))|V (x(t))〉 ≥ 0, (5.8)
with equality if and only if V (x(t)) = 0, i.e. f is a strict global Lyapunov function
for (RmD).
When (RmD) is (Lipschitz) continuous, a standard argument shows that every
ω-limit point of (RmD) is a rest point thereof (see e.g. Sandholm, 2010c, Theorem
7.B.3). The discontinuous case requires a different treatment. To start, note that
d
dt
f(x(t)) = 〈v(x(t))|V (x(t))〉 = 〈v](x),Πx(v](x))〉x ≥ ‖V (x(t))‖2x ≥ 0, (5.9)
where the first inequality follows from Moreau’s decomposition theorem. Both
inequalities bind if and only if V (x(t)) = 0; since the speed function x 7→ ‖V (x)‖x
is lower semi-continuous (cf. Lemma B.2), Proposition B.1 shows that every ω-limit
point of (RmD) is a rest point. 
36Definitions concerning stability and convergence in dynamical systems are collected in Ap-
pendix B.
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As we discussed in Section 2.3, the original analyses of Kimura (1958) and
Shahshahani (1979) showed that, in common interest games, average payoffs are
increased at a maximal rate under the replicator dynamics, provided that “maxi-
mal” is defined with respect to the Shahshahani metric. We conclude this section
by noting an analogous principle for all Riemannian game dynamics.
Doing so requires an additional definition from Riemannian geometry. For a
given Riemannian metric g on the positive orthant K◦ of RA, the gradient of a
smooth function f : K◦ → R is defined as
gradf(x) = df ](x), (5.10)
that is, as the (necessarily unique) vector satisfying
〈df(x)|z〉 = 〈gradf(x), z〉x for all z ∈ RA and x ∈ K◦. (5.11)
Geometrically, the vector gradf(x) represents the direction of maximal increase of
the function f at x with respect to the metric g.37 We thus obtain the steepest
ascent principle:
Proposition 5.6. Let G be a potential game with potential function f , and let g
be an extendable Riemannian metric. Then, for all x ∈ X ◦, the vector field that
defines (RmD) is the projection of gradf onto TX (x) with respect to g.
Proof. Since v(x) = df(x), we have Πx(v](x)) = Πx(gradf(x)), as claimed. 
Hence, at interior states, the dynamics (RmD) increase the value of potential
at a maximal rate under the geometry defined by g, subject to feasibility. For
discontinuous dynamics, this conclusion remains true even at boundary states. For
continuous dynamics, the interior of each face of X is invariant under (RmD),
so the conclusion holds provided that feasibility is understood to incorporate this
additional constraint.
6. Hessian game dynamics
By virtue of the integrability property that defines them, potential games have
desirable convergence properties under a wide range of dynamics. By contrast,
convergence results for other classes of games – for instance, contractive games and
games with an evolutionarily stable state (ESS) – require additional structure, often
taking the form of integrability properties built into the dynamics themselves.38 In
this section, we show that the integrability of Hessian Riemannian metrics allows us
to generalize several properties of the replicator dynamics and the Euclidean projec-
tion dynamics to the class of Hessian dynamics introduced in Section 4. Conversely,
this analysis pinpoints the fundamental integrability property that underlies a va-
riety of convergence results for the replicator and the projection dynamics.
A key element of our analysis is the so-called Bregman divergence, which we
introduce in Section 6.1. Section 6.2 establishes global convergence to equilibrium
in contractive games and local stability of ESSs, while Section 6.3 demonstrates the
convergence of the time-averages of interior trajectories to Nash equilibrium and
provides sufficient conditions for permanence. Finally, Section 6.4 establishes the
elimination of strictly dominated strategies under continuous Hessian dynamics.
37Specifically, this means that gradf(x) = argmax{Dzf(x) : ‖z‖x = 1}; that this is so follows
from the definition of gradf(x) and the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
38See Hofbauer and Sandholm (2007) and Sandholm (2010a).
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6.1. Bregman divergences. When used as a tool for establishing convergence,
Lyapunov functions typically measure some sort of “distance” between the current
state and a target state x∗. For Hessian dynamics, a natural point of departure is
the potential function h of the metric g = Hessh that defines the dynamics (HD).
However, since the (game-defined) target state x∗ is independent of g, there is no
reason that h itself should be able to serve as a Lyapunov function. Instead, we
take advantage of the convexity of h and consider the difference between h(x∗) and
the best linear approximation of h(x∗) from x.
Formally, the Bregman divergence of h (Bregman, 1967) is defined as
Dh(x
∗, x) = h(x∗)− h(x)− h′(x;x∗ − x), x∗, x ∈ X , (6.1)
where h′(x;x∗ − x) is the one-sided derivative of h at x along x∗ − x, i.e.
h′(x;x∗ − x) = lim
t→0+
t−1 [h(x+ t(x∗ − x))− h(x)] . (6.2)
Since h is convex, we have
Dh(x
∗, x) ≥ 0, with equality if and only if x∗ = x. (6.3)
On the other hand, Dh is not symmetric in x∗ and x, so it is not a bona fide distance
function on X ; rather, Dh(x∗, x) describes the remoteness of x from the base point
x∗, hence the name “divergence”.
Revisiting our two archetypal examples, the Euclidean metric is generated by
the quadratic potential h(x) = 12
∑
α x
2
α. Definition (6.1) then yields the Euclidean
divergence
DEucl(x
∗, x) =
1
2
∑
α
(xα − x∗α)2, (6.4a)
which is (uncharacteristically) symmetric in x∗ and x. Analogously, the Shahsha-
hani metric is generated by the (negative) entropy h(x) =
∑
α xα log xα. A short
calculation then shows that the corresponding divergence function is the Kull-
back–Leibler (KL) divergence
DKL(x
∗, x) =
∑
α: x∗α>0
x∗α log(x
∗
α/xα), (6.4b)
which has been used extensively in the analysis of the replicator dynamics (Hofbauer
and Sigmund, 1998; Weibull, 1995).
The key qualitative difference between the Euclidean divergence (6.4a) and the
KL divergence (6.4b) is that the former is finite for all x, x∗ ∈ X whereas the latter
blows up to +∞ when supp(x∗) * supp(x). The reason for this blow-up is that
the entropy function h(x) =
∑
α xα log xα becomes infinitely steep as any boundary
point x of X is approached from the interior of X , i.e.
supα∈A|∂αh(xn)| → ∞ for every interior sequence xn converging to x. (6.5)
When this is the case for all x ∈ bd(X ), we will say that h is steep (Alvarez et al.,
2004; Coucheney et al., 2015; Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2002). At the opposite end
of the spectrum, if dh(x) exists for all x ∈ X , we will say that h is nonsteep.
The link between steepness of h and finiteness of the associated Bregman diver-
gence is provided by the following lemma:
Proposition 6.1. Fix x∗ ∈ X and let D(x∗) denote the union of the relative
interiors of the faces of X that contain x∗, i.e.
D(x∗) ≡ {x ∈ X : supp(x∗) ⊆ supp(x)}. (6.6)
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If h is steep, we have Dh(x∗, x) <∞ for all x ∈ D(x∗); otherwise, if h is nonsteep,
we have Dh(x∗, x) <∞ for all x ∈ X .
Proof. If h is steep and x ∈ D(x∗), the smoothness of h on the face of X spanned
by supp(x) ⊇ supp(x∗) implies that the directional derivative h′(x;x∗ − x) exists
and is finite, so Dh(x∗, x) is itself finite. If instead h is nonsteep, h′(x;x∗−x) exists
and is finite for all x ∈ X , so again Dh(x∗, x) <∞. 
Remark 6.2. The implication of Proposition 6.1 for steep h can be turned into an
equivalence (i.e. Dh(x∗, x) <∞ if and only if x ∈ D(x∗)) by slightly strengthening
the steepness requirement (6.5) to hold for every sequence xn with constant sup-
port supp(xn) ) supp(x) and taking the supremum over supp(xn) instead of A.
Separable h that satisfy (6.5) automatically satisfy this stronger requirement.
Beyond the positive-definiteness property (6.3), the attribute of the Bregman
divergence that recommends it as a Lyapunov function for (HD) is that the level
sets of Dh(x∗, ·) are radial with respect to x∗, i.e. they are perpendicular to all
rays emanating from x∗ under the HR metric g = Hessh. Formally, we have:
Proposition 6.3. Let g = Hessh be an extendable HR metric and let x∗ ∈ X .
Then, for every smooth curve x(t) with constant support containing that of x∗, we
have:
d
dt
Dh(x
∗, x(t)) = 〈x˙(t), x(t)− x∗〉x(t). (6.7)
In particular, if Dh(x∗, x(t)) is constant, x˙(t) is perpendicular to x(t)−x∗. Finally,
if h is nonsteep, the above conclusions hold for every smooth curve x(t) on X .
Proof. The proof is a direct application of the chain rule:
d
dt
Dh(x
∗, x) = −
∑
α
[
∂h
∂xα
x˙α +
∂h
∂xα
d
dt
(x∗α − xα) +
∑
β
∂2h
∂xα∂xβ
(x∗α − xα)x˙β
]
=
∑
α,β
(x∗α − xα)gαβ(x)x˙β = 〈x˙, x− x∗〉x, (6.8)
where all summations are taken over the (constant) support A′ ≡ supp(x(t)) of
x(t) and we used the fact that x˙α = 0 for α /∈ A′. Finally, in the nonsteep case, h
is smooth throughout X , so the above holds for every smooth curve x(t). 
Within the class of Hessian Riemannian metrics, steepness of the potential func-
tion h roughly corresponds to minimal-rank extendability of the metric g = Hessh,
and nonsteepness of h to full-rank extendability of g. These analogies fail when the
steepness of h does not adequately control the regularity of g near the boundary of
X , or when g is minimal-rank extendable but generates non-Lipschitz dynamics.39
Bearing this in mind, we use the term continuous Hessian dynamics for Riemannian
dynamics generated by a minimal-rank extendable metric g = Hessh with steep h,
and the term discontinuous Hessian dynamics for Riemannian dynamics generated
by a full-rank extendable metric g = Hessh with nonsteep h. In what follows, we
will tacitly assume that the dynamics (HD) are either continuous or discontinuous.
39A Hessian metric with a steep potential function that is not minimal-rank extendable is the
separable metric (Example 4.6) with weighting function φ(z) = 1/(1 + sin2(1/z)/z). Conversely,
the separable metrics with weighting functions φ(z) = zp for p ∈ (0, 1), corresponding to the
the non-Lipschitz cases of the p-replicator dynamics (Examples 4.8 and 5.1), are minimal-rank
extendable but have nonsteep potential functions.
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6.2. Contractive games and evolutionarily stable states. Recall that a pop-
ulation game G ≡ G(A, v) is called contractive if 〈v(x′) − v(x)|x′ − x〉 ≤ 0 for all
x, x′ ∈ X , strictly contractive if the inequality is strict whenever x 6= x′, and con-
servative if the inequality always binds (cf. Example 2.3). As is well known, the set
of Nash equilibria of any contractive game is convex and every strictly contractive
game admits a unique Nash equilibrium (Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2009).
Combining the defining inequality of strictly contractive games with the vari-
ational characterization of Nash equilibria (3.7), it follows that the (necessarily
unique) Nash equilibrium of a strictly contractive game satisfies the inequality
〈v(x)|x− x∗〉 ≤ 0 with equality if and only if x = x∗. (6.9)
Hofbauer and Sandholm (2009) call a state satisfying (6.9) a globally evolutionarily
stable state (GESS). This is the global version of the seminal local solution concept
of Maynard Smith and Price (1973): if (6.9) holds for all x 6= x∗ in a neighborhood
of x∗, then x∗ is called an evolutionarily stable state (ESS).40
It is well known that the GESS x∗ of a strictly contractive game is asymptotically
stable under the replicator dynamics (RD), attracting all solutions whose initial
support contains that of x∗; by comparison, x∗ is globally asymptotically stable
under the Euclidean projection dynamics (PD). Theorem 6.4 extends these results
to all Hessian dynamics (HD).
Theorem 6.4. Let G be the (necessarily unique) Nash equilibrium of a strictly
contractive game G. Then:
(i) For all continuous Hessian dynamics, Dh(x∗, ·) is a decreasing strict Lya-
punov function on D(x∗), and x∗ is asymptotically stable with basin D(x∗).
(ii) For all discontinuous Hessian dynamics, Dh(x∗, ·) is a decreasing strict global
Lyapunov function, and x∗ is globally asymptotically stable.
Proof. We begin with the continuous case. By Proposition 5.2(i), every solution
x(t) of (HD) has constant support. Hence, if x(0) ∈ D(x∗), Proposition 6.3 yields:
d
dt
Dh(x
∗, x) = 〈x˙, x− x∗〉x = 〈Πx(v](x)), x− x∗〉x
= 〈v](x), x− x∗〉x = 〈v(x)|x− x∗〉, (6.10a)
≤ 0, (6.10b)
where we used the definition of Πx for minimal-rank extendable metrics (cf. Section
3.5) to obtain (6.10a) and the definition (6.9) of a GESS for (6.10b). Since equality
in (6.10) holds if and only if x = x∗, we conclude that Dh(x∗, x) is a strict Lyapunov
function on D(x∗). If we can show in addition that x(t) has no ω-limit points
in X \ D(x∗), then asymptotic stability with basin D(x∗) follows from standard
arguments (see e.g. Sandholm (2010c), Theorem 7.B.3).
Assume therefore that x(t) admits an ω-limit point xˆ 6= x∗, so x(tn) → xˆ for
some sequence of times tn ↗ ∞. Since |x˙α(t)| is bounded from above by Vmax ≡
supx∈X maxβ |Vβ(x)| < ∞, there exists an open neighborhood U of xˆ and positive
a, δ, n0 > 0 such that x(t) ∈ U and 〈v(x(t))|x(t)−x∗〉 ≤ −a < 0 for all t ∈ [tn, tn+δ]
40This concise characterization of evolutionary stability is due to Hofbauer et al. (1979).
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and for all n ≥ n0. Hence, by (6.10), we get
Dh(x
∗, x(tn + δ))−Dh(x∗, x(0)) ≤
∫ tn+δ
0
〈v(x(s))|x(s)− x∗〉 ds ≤ −a(n− n0)δ.
(6.11)
Thus lim inft→∞Dh(x∗, x(t)) = −∞, a contradiction.
For the discontinuous case, note first that since x∗ − x ∈ TCX (x), Moreau’s
decomposition theorem implies that 〈Πx(v](x)), x− x∗〉x ≤ 〈v](x), x− x∗〉x. Thus,
replacing the first equality in (6.10a) by an inequality, (6.10) shows that Dh(x∗, ·)
is a strict global Lyapunov function for (HD). Global asymptotic stability then
follows from Proposition B.1. 
The only implication of G being strictly contractive used in the previous proof
is that its Nash equilibrium is a GESS. More generally, if a game admits an ESS
x∗, applying the above arguments in a neighborhood of x∗ defined by a level set of
Dh(x
∗, ·) yields the following result:
Theorem 6.5. Evolutionarily stable states are asymptotically stable under (HD).
Hofbauer and Sigmund (1990), Hopkins (1999), and Harper (2011) all offer re-
sults on the local stability of interior evolutionarily stable states under Riemannian
game dynamics. Hofbauer and Sigmund (1990) show that under all Riemannian
(not necessarily Hessian) dynamics (RD), the function L(x) = 〈x− x∗, x− x∗〉x∗ is
a local strict Lyapunov function for interior ESSs x∗, implying that x∗ is asymptot-
ically stable. Likewise, Hopkins (1999) uses linearization to establish local stability
of regular interior ESSs (Taylor and Jonker, 1978) under Riemannian dynamics
(RD). Finally, Harper (2011) employs a version of the argument above to prove
asymptotic stability of ESSs for separable Hessian dynamics of the form (4.5).
An important case of contractive games that do not admit an ESS is the class
of conservative games, which include population games generated by matching in
symmetric zero-sum games. Under the replicator dynamics, the KL divergence
does not provide a strict Lyapunov function for conservative games, but instead
a constant of motion. The following result extends this conclusion to all Hessian
dynamics:
Proposition 6.6. Let x∗ be a Nash equilibrium of a conservative game G. Then,
Dh(x
∗, ·) is a constant of motion along any interior solution segment of (HD).
Proof. Simply note that (6.10) binds if G is conservative and x ∈ X ◦. 
Remark 6.7. In the definition of (HD), we required that h be finite throughout
X . This requirement is unnecessary for the preceding results when x∗ is interior;
however, if x∗ lies on the boundary of X , the proofs of Theorems 6.4 and 6.5
do not go through because Dh(x∗, ·) is no longer well-defined throughout D(x∗).
Nevertheless, the results themselves remain true if g = Hessh is separable, allowing
us to handle the p-replicator dynamics for p ≥ 2 (Example 4.8). To prove this,
it suffices to replace the summation in (6.1) with a sum over all strategies in the
support of x∗; after this patch, the analysis above goes through unchanged.
6.3. Convergence of time-averaged trajectories and permanence. We now
extend two classic results for the replicator dynamics in random matching games
(Example 2.1) to Hessian dynamics. The results for these games take advantage of
the linearity of payoffs vα(x) =
∑
β∈AAαβxβ in the population state.
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The first such result states that if a solution x(t) of the replicator dynamics
stays a minimal positive distance away from the boundary of the simplex, the time-
averaged orbit x¯(t) = t−1
∫ t
0
x(s) ds converges to the set of Nash equilibria of the
underlying game (Schuster et al., 1981). The normal form games to which this result
applies include zero-sum games (cf. Proposition 6.6) and games satisfying sufficient
conditions for permanence (cf. Proposition 6.9 below). The following proposition
shows that this convergence property extends to all Hessian dynamics:
Proposition 6.8. Let G be a random matching game and let x(t) be a solution
orbit of (HD). If x(t) is contained in a compact subset of X ◦, the time-averaged
orbit x¯(t) = t−1
∫ t
0
x(s) ds converges to the Nash set of G.
In the case of the replicator dynamics, this is proved by introducing the auxiliary
variables yα = log xα and using the fact that y˙ = x˙/x. To extend this proof to
(HD), we instead define y via the Bregman divergence of h:
Proof of Proposition 6.8. Let yα = Dh(eα, x), so y˙α = 〈v(x)|x〉 − vα(x) by Propo-
sition 6.3. Then, for all α, β ∈ A, we get
yα(t)− yβ(t) = cαβ +
∫ t
0
[vβ(x(s))− vα(x(s))] ds, (6.12)
where cαβ = yα(0) − yβ(0). Since x(t) is contained in a compact subset of X ◦,
Proposition 6.1 implies that supt yα(t) < ∞ for all α ∈ A. Thus, dividing both
sides of (6.12) by t and taking the limit t→∞, we obtain
lim
t→∞ [vα(x¯(t))− vβ(x¯(t))] = 0, (6.13)
where we have used the linearity of vα(x) =
∑
β Aαβxβ in x to bring the integral
into the arguments of vα and vβ .
Equation (6.13) implies that if x¯∗ is an ω-limit point of x¯(t), then vα(x¯∗) = vβ(x¯∗)
for all α, β ∈ A, so x¯∗ is a Nash equilibrium of G. Since X is compact, every solution
of (HD) converges to its ω-limit set, and our assertion follows. 
Proposition 6.8 applies when the population share of each strategy remains
bounded away from zero along all interior solution trajectories, a property known
as permanence. Formally, a dynamical system on X is called permanent if there is
a threshold δ > 0 such that every interior solution satisfies lim inft→∞ xα(t) ≥ δ for
all α ∈ A.
Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) establish a sufficient condition for permanence
under the replicator dynamics. Proposition 6.9 extends this result to all continuous
Hessian dynamics, providing a sufficient condition for Proposition 6.8 to apply:
Proposition 6.9. Let G be a random matching game. Assume that the dynamics
(HD) are continuous and there exists some p ∈ X ◦ such that
〈v(x∗)|p− x∗〉 > 0 for all boundary rest points x∗ of (HD). (6.14)
Then, the dynamics (HD) are permanent.
The proof of Proposition 6.9 follows the same lines as that of Theorem 13.6.1 of
Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998), and is presented in Appendix C.
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6.4. Dominated strategies. We conclude our analysis by considering the elimi-
nation and survival of dominated strategies under (HD). To that end, recall that
α ∈ A is strictly dominated by β ∈ A if vα(x) < vβ(x) for all x ∈ X . More gen-
erally, p ∈ X is strictly dominated by q ∈ X if 〈v(x)|p〉 < 〈v(x)|q〉 for all x ∈ X ,
meaning that the average payoff of a small influx of mutants is always higher when
the mutants are distributed according to q rather than p. We then say that p ∈ X
becomes extinct along trajectory x(t) if min{xα(t) : α ∈ supp(x∗)} → 0 as t→∞,
or equivalently, if there are no ω-limit points of x(t) in D(p).
Under the replicator dynamics, it is well known that dominated strategies become
extinct along every interior solution trajectory (Akin, 1980). As we show below,
this elimination result extends to all continuous Hessian dynamics (HD):
Proposition 6.10. Under all continuous Hessian dynamics (HD), strictly domi-
nated strategies become extinct along all interior solution trajectories.
Proof. The proof follows a standard argument for the replicator dynamics, replacing
the KL divergence (6.4b) with the Bregman divergence (6.1). Specifically, Propo-
sition 6.3 implies that along any interior solution x(t),
d
dt
(Dh(p, x)−Dh(q, x)) = 〈x˙, x− p〉x − 〈x˙, x− q〉x
= 〈Πx(v](x)), q − p〉x = 〈v](x), q − p〉x = 〈v(x)|q − p〉, (6.15)
where the penultimate equality uses the fact that x ∈ X ◦. Since q strictly dominates
p and v is continuous, we have 〈v(x)|q − p〉 ≥ a for some positive constant a > 0,
implying that Dh(p, x(t))→∞. Hence, by Proposition 6.1, we conclude that {x(t)}
has no ω-limit points in D(p). 
The conclusion of Proposition 6.10 is false for discontinuous Hessian dynamics:
Sandholm et al. (2008) construct a four-strategy game with a strictly dominated
strategy that is played recurrently by a nonnegligible fraction of the population
under the Euclidean projection dynamics (PD). The argument above shows that
this strategy must become less common when the state is in the interior of X ;
however, solutions to (PD) are able to enter and leave the boundary of X , and
while there, dominated strategies may become more common.
7. Hessian game dynamics and reinforcement learning
Under a variety of reinforcement learning processes for normal form games, mixed
strategies evolve according to the replicator dynamics – see e.g. Börgers and Sarin
(1997), Posch (1997), Rustichini (1999), Hopkins (2002) and Hofbauer et al. (2009).
We conclude the paper by describing a broader connection between reinforcement
learning and Hessian game dynamics.
Our starting point is a class of reinforcement learning dynamics for N -player
normal form games introduced by Coucheney et al. (2015) and Mertikopoulos and
Sandholm (2016). Over the course of play, each player maintains a score vector
representing the cumulative payoffs of each of his actions; then, at each moment
in time, the player selects a mixed strategy by applying a choice map to this score
vector, similar in function to the perturbed best response maps used in stochastic
fictitious play and perturbed best response dynamics (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998;
Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2002, 2007).
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Formally, let vkα(x) denote the expected payoff of the α-th action of player k
at mixed strategy profile x = (x1, . . . , xN ) in an N -player normal form game. The
choice map Qk of player k is then defined as
Qk(yk) = arg max
xk∈Xk
{〈yk|xk〉 − hk(xk)}, (7.1)
where Xk ≡ ∆(Ak) denotes the mixed strategy space of player k (Ak being the
corresponding action set), and hk : Xk → R is a smooth, strongly convex penalty
function. The reinforcement learning process described above can then be written
as
y˙k = vk(x)
xk = Qk(yk).
(RL)
Now, let gk = Hesshk and write nkα(x) =
∑
β∈Ak g
−1
k,αβ(x). Mertikopoulos and
Sandholm (2016) show that when the mixed strategy profile x(t) is interior, its
evolution under (RL) is described by the dynamics
x˙kα =
∑
β∈Ak
[
g−1k,αβ(x)−
nkα(x)nkβ(x)∑
γ nkγ(x)
]
vkβ(x). (RLD)
Thus, writing g]k(x) for g
−1
k (x) and comparing the result to (4.1b) shows that the
dynamics of mixed strategies under (RL) agree with the Hessian dynamics (HD) at
interior states.41
The derivation of (HD) here and of (RLD) in Mertikopoulos and Sandholm
(2016) have very different starting points, leaving the reason behind their equiv-
alence somewhat mysterious. In Appendix A.2, we derive both dynamics using a
common set of tools – convex conjugates and pseudoinverses – making the reasons
behind this equivalence clearer.42
Since continuous Hessian dynamics coincide with the reinforcement scheme (RL)
when the penalty functions hk are steep, certain results for interior trajectories –
Propositions 6.8 and 6.10 in particular – can be obtained directly from the analysis
of Mertikopoulos and Sandholm (2016). On the other hand, in the nonsteep regime,
(RLD) and (HD) still agree at interior states, but their behavior at the boundary
differs in a fundamental way. Specifically, while the boundary behavior of discontin-
uous Hessian dynamics is defined using closest point projections, the reinforcement
learning process (RL) for nonsteep h can no longer be reduced to mixed strategy
dynamics at all. Instead one must work explicitly with the score variables yk, which
continue to aggregate payoff data of all strategies, even those that are not used.
Among other things, this means that a strong cumulative performance of an unused
strategy will return it to use.
This difference between how the processes are defined on the boundary has im-
portant consequences. For instance, while Sandholm et al. (2008) show that strictly
dominated strategies may survive under the Euclidean projection dynamics, Mer-
tikopoulos and Sandholm (2016) prove that the reinforcement learning process (RL)
41While we have defined Riemannian game dynamics for single population games and rein-
forcement learning for N -person normal form games, this difference is of no consequence. One
can similarly define Riemannian game dynamics for multipopulation games, or a symmetrized
reinforcement learning process for symmetric two-player normal form games (cf. Appendix A.2).
42The usefulness of convex conjugates in analyzing maps of the form (7.1) is well known in
learning and optimization – see e.g. Nemirovski and Yudin (1983), Hofbauer and Sandholm
(2002), Shalev-Shwartz (2011), and Kwon and Mertikopoulos (2014).
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always eliminates dominated strategies, whether the penalty functions are steep or
not. Under both processes, dominated strategies are initially eliminated along in-
terior solution trajectories. But while they may resurface under (HD), the score
variables of (RL) continue to register the poor performance of these strategies,
ensuring that they remain extinct for all time.
Appendix A. Connections with other game dynamics
Throughout this appendix, we write 1 ∈ Rn for the n-dimensional column vector
of ones, and Φ = I − 1n11> for the Euclidean orthogonal projection of Rn onto
Rn0 = {z ∈ Rn : 1>z = 0} = span(1)⊥.43 Recall also that the (Moore-Penrose)
pseudoinverse of a matrix M ∈ Rn×n is the unique matrix M+ ∈ Rn×n such that
(i) M+y = 0 whenever y ∈ range(M)⊥; and (ii) M+y = x whenever x ∈ ker(M)⊥,
y ∈ range(M), and Mx = y (Friedberg et al., 2002, Sec. 6.7). Since a symmetric
matrixM ∈ Rn×n satisfies range(M) = ker(M)⊥, we have the following well-known
characterization of pseudoinverses from linear algebra:
Lemma A.1. Let M ∈ Rn×n be a symmetric matrix. Then, M+ is the unique
matrix that (i) inverts M on ker(M)⊥ = range(M); and (ii) satisfies ker(M+) =
ker(M).
A.1. Interior equivalence of Riemannian dynamics and Hopkins’ dynam-
ics. We now derive the equivalence between (RmD) and Hopkins’ dynamics (2.10)
on X ◦, as noted in Section 2.3. To begin with, we say that M ∈ Rn×n is a Hopkins
matrix if it is positive-definite with respect to Rn0 and maps 1 to 0. The following
lemma establishes a basic characterization of Hopkins matrices:
Lemma A.2.
(i) If H ∈ Rn×n is symmetric positive-definite, then (ΦHΦ)+ is a Hopkins matrix
and
(ΦHΦ)+ = H−1 − H
−111>H−1
1>H−11
. (A.1)
(ii) Conversely, if M is a Hopkins matrix, then M = (ΦHΦ)+, where H = M +
11> is symmetric positive definite.
Proof. To prove part (i), let H be symmetric positive definite. Then the sym-
metric matrix ΦHΦ is positive definite with respect to Rn0 and maps 1 to 0, so
range(ΦHΦ) = ker(ΦHΦ)> = Rn0 . If we denote the right-hand side of (A.1) by H¯,
a straightforward calculation shows that H¯ΦHΦz = z for all z ∈ Rn0 and H¯1 = 0.
Thus Lemma A.1 implies that H¯ = (ΦHΦ)+. That this is a Hopkins matrix is
immediate from the fact that range(ΦHΦ) = ker(ΦHΦ)⊥ = Rn0 and Lemma A.1.
To prove part (ii), let M be a Hopkins matrix and let H = M + 11>. Clearly H
is symmetric positive-definite. Moreover, writing out (ΦHΦ)+ using the right-hand
side of (A.1) and simplifying the result yields (ΦHΦ)+ = M . 
With Lemma A.2 at hand, Proposition A.3 below establishes the equivalence
between (2.10) and (RmD) on X ◦, and provides a concise third representation for
both dynamics:
43In the above and what follows, W⊥ denotes the orthogonal complement of a subspace W
of Rn, defined with respect to the ordinary Euclidean metric. Even though this might seem to
suggest that the Euclidean metric plays a special role in what follows, it is just an artifact of
writing everything in coordinates instead of abstractly; for a detailed discussion, see Lang (1987).
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Proposition A.3. Let x˙ = V (x) be a dynamical system on X ◦. Then, the following
are equivalent:
(i) There is a smooth field of Hopkins matrices M : X ◦ → RA×A such that
V (x) = M(x) v(x)> for all x ∈ X ◦. (A.2a)
(ii) There is a smooth field of positive-definite matrices H : X ◦ → RA×A such that
V (x) = (ΦH(x)Φ)+v(x)> for all x ∈ X ◦. (A.2b)
(iii) There is a smooth Riemannian metric g on K◦ such that
V (x) = Πx(v
](x)) for all x ∈ X ◦. (A.2c)
Proof. The equivalence of statements (i) and (ii) follows directly from Lemma A.2.
Statements (ii) and (iii) are equivalent because
Πx(v
](x)) =
(
g](x)− g
](x)11>g](x)
1>g](x)1
)
v(x)> = (Φg(x)Φ)+v(x)>. (A.3)
The first equality in (A.3) follows from expression (4.1b) for (RmD) on X ◦, and the
second follows from Lemma A.2(i) and the fact that g](x) = g−1(x); the equivalence
of (ii) and (iii) then follows by setting g = H.44 
A.2. Equivalence of continuous Hessian dynamics and reinforcement learn-
ing. We now describe a common derivation of the reinforcement learning dynamics
(RLD) and (HD) in the continuous regime. Of course, the equivalence of (HD) and
(RLD) for steep h already follows from the derivation of (RLD) in Mertikopoulos
and Sandholm (2016); the point of this appendix is to provide an alternative, more
transparent view of this equivalence.
The starting point for both (HD) and (RLD) is the potential function h. For
convenience, we assume throughout this appendix that (i) h is defined on the entire
positive orthant K◦; (ii) h is smooth and strongly convex on K◦; and (iii) h is steep
at the boundary of K in the sense of (6.5).
We now review some facts from convex analysis (for complete treatments, see
Rockafellar, 1970, or Hiriart-Urruty and Lemaréchal, 2001). First, the convex con-
jugate of h is defined as
h∗(y) = sup
x∈K◦
{〈y|x〉 − h(x)}, y ∈ (Rn)∗. (A.4)
Since h is steep and strongly convex, the supremum above is attained at a unique
point QK(y) ∈ K◦ (Rockafellar, 1970, Theorem 26.5).45 By the first-order optimal-
ity conditions for (A.4), we then get
QK(y) ≡ arg max
x∈K◦
{〈y|x〉 − h(x)} = (dh)−1(y), (A.5)
while applying the envelope theorem to (A.4) leads to Legendre’s identity :
dh∗(y) = QK(y) = (dh)−1(y). (A.6)
44To formally complete the argument that (ii) implies (iii), we observe without proof that the
field H on X ◦ can be smoothly extended to K◦.
45Since h is strongly convex, it is bounded below by a strictly convex quadratic function (Hiriart-
Urruty and Lemaréchal, 2001, Theorem B.4.1.1), which in turn implies that the domain of h∗ is
(Rn)∗ (Rockafellar, 1970, Corollary 13.1).
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Convex conjugation is an involution in that the biconjugate h∗∗ : K◦ → R is
equal to h, viz.
h(x) = sup{〈y|x〉 − h∗(y) : y ∈ (Rn)∗} for all x ∈ K◦. (A.7)
The same reasoning as above then yields:
dh(x) = (dh∗)−1(x) for all x ∈ K◦. (A.8)
Finally, by differentiating the identity dh(dh∗(y)) = y and applying Legendre’s
identity, we get
Hessh∗(y) = Hessh(x)−1, (A.9)
with the latter Hessian evaluated at x = QK(y). As the Hessians of h and h∗ play
a key role in what follows, we henceforth write H(x) = Hessh(x) and H∗(y) =
Hessh∗(y).
With these tools at hand, we introduce full-dimensional analogues of continuous
Hessian dynamics and (symmetric) reinforcement learning, taking K◦ as the state
space (and so defining payoffs v on K◦). In the case of (HD), the full-dimensional
domain makes projections redundant, so the induced dynamics take the form
x˙ = v](x) = g](x) v(x)> = g−1(x) v(x)> = H−1(x) v(x)>. (HDK)
Likewise, the full-dimensional analogue of (RL) is
y˙ = v(x),
x = QK(y),
(RLK)
with QK defined as in (A.5) above. Differentiating (RLK) and applying (A.6) and
(A.9) then yields
x˙ = dQK(y)v(x)> = H∗(y)v(x)> = H−1(x)v(x)>, (RLDK)
showing that the dynamics (HDK) and (RLDK) are equivalent.
Under the actual dynamics (HD) and (RLD), the state is restricted to the simplex
X , and its interior X ◦ is an invariant set. As (HDK) and (RLDK) are defined in
terms of the Hessian H(x), we can try to recover (HD) and (RLD) by restricting the
action of H(x) to the tangent space of X ◦. To do so while preserving the symmetry
of H(x), we can replace H(x) with the “projected” matrix ΦH(x)Φ. Then, to mimic
the derivation of (HDK) and (RLDK), we must next “invert” ΦH(x)Φ. In light of
Lemma A.1, the natural choice is to take the pseudoinverse of ΦH(x)Φ, leading to
the dynamics
x˙ = (ΦH(x)Φ)+v(x)>. (A.10)
Proposition A.3 shows that (A.10) is equivalent to the continuous Hessian dynam-
ics (HD). With some additional work, one can then show directly that (A.10) is
equivalent to the reinforcement learning dynamics (RLD).
Appendix B. Convergence and stability in dynamical systems
B.1. Definitions. Throughout this appendix, we focus on the general dynamics
x˙ = V (x), x ∈ X , (D)
and we assume that they admit unique solutions from every initial condition. In
this context, we say that xˆ is an ω-limit point of the solution orbit x(t) if there
is an increasing sequence of times tn ↗ ∞ such that limx(tn) = x∗. We further
say that x∗ is Lyapunov stable if, for every neighborhood U of x∗, there exists
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a neighborhood U ′ of x∗ such that every solution orbit x(t) that starts in U ′ is
contained in U for all t ≥ 0. By the same token, x∗ is attracting if there is a
neighborhood U of x∗ such that every solution that starts in U converges to x∗;
finally, x∗ is called asymptotically stable if it is Lyapunov stable and attracting. In
this case, the maximal (relatively) open set of states from which solutions converge
to x∗ is called the basin of x∗, and if the basin of x∗ is all of X , we say that x∗ is
globally asymptotically stable.
B.2. A global convergence result. A standard result from dynamical systems
states that if a smooth dynamical system on a compact set admits a strict global
Lyapunov function, all ω-limit points are rest points (see e.g. Sandholm, 2010c,
Theorem 7.B.3). The proof of this result relies on the continuity of solutions on
initial conditions, a property which is not easily established for discontinuous dy-
namics. In Proposition B.1 below, we present a global convergence result that does
not require continuity of solutions in initial conditions, but instead relies on a l.s.c.
lower bound on the derivative of the Lyapunov function. To state it, let
RP = {x ∈ X : V (x) = 0} (B.1)
denote the set of rest points of the dynamics (D). We then have:
Proposition B.1. Let x(t) be an absolutely continuous solution orbit of (D) and
let Γ+ = x(R+) denote the set of points visited by x(t). Assume further that RP is
closed and there exist functions L : X → R and φ : X → R+ such that:
(i) L is differentiable in a neighborhood of Γ+.
(ii) φ is lower semi-continuous and φ(x) = 0 if and only if x ∈ RP.
(iii) 〈dL(x)|V (x)〉 ≥ φ(x) for all x ∈ Γ+.
Then, x(t) converges to RP.
Proof. By absolute continuity and Conditions (i) and (iii) above, we get
L(x(t))− L(x(0)) =
∫ t
0
〈dL(x(s))|V (x(s))〉 ds ≥
∫ t
0
φ(x(s)) ds ≥ 0, (B.2)
i.e. L is nondecreasing along x(t). Furthermore, since X is compact, x(t) admits at
least one ω-limit point x∗ ∈ cl(Γ+) ⊆ X . Assume now that x(t) admits an ω-limit
point xˆ such that V (xˆ) 6= 0. Since RP is closed, Condition (ii) implies that there
is a compact neighborhood K of xˆ and some a > 0 such that φ(x) ≥ a > 0 for all
x ∈ K. With this in mind, we consider two complementary cases below:
Case 1 . Suppose that there exists some T ≥ 0 such that x(t) ∈ K for all t ≥ T .
Then φ(x(t)) ≥ a for all t ≥ T , so (B.2) yields limt→∞ L(x(t)) =∞, a contradiction.
Case 2 . Assume instead that, for all T ≥ 0, we have x(t) /∈ K for some t ≥ T . In
this case, there exist open neighborhoods U and U ′ of xˆ with cl(U) ⊆ U ′ ⊂ K, and
interlaced sequences tn, t′n ↗∞ such that, for all n: (i) tn < t′n < tn+1; (ii) x(tn) ∈
U , x(t′n) ∈ K \ U ′; and (iii) x(t) ∈ K whenever t ∈ [tn, t′n]. Then, since |x˙α(t)|
is bounded from above by Vmax ≡ supx∈X maxβ |Vβ(x)| < ∞, the time intervals
δn ≡ t′n − tn will be bounded from below by δmin ≡ dist(cl(U),K \ U ′)/Vmax > 0.
We thus get
L(x(t′n))− L(x(0)) ≥
∫ t′n
0
φ(x(s)) ds ≥
n∑
j=1
∫ t′j
tj
φ(x(s)) ds ≥ anδmin, (B.3)
i.e. L(x(t′n))→∞, a contradiction. 
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To apply Proposition B.1 to discontinuous Riemannian dynamics in potential
games, we need the following result:
Lemma B.2. The speed of motion ‖V (x)‖x of the dynamics (RmD) is l.s.c. on X .
Proof. If the dynamics (RmD) are continuous, our claim follows immediately from
the continuity of the underlying metric – in fact, ‖V (x)‖x is continuous in this
case. Otherwise, if (RmD) is discontinuous, recall that V (x) ≡ Πx(v](x)) is
simply the projection of v](x) on the tangent cone TCX (x) to X at x (because
Admg(x) = TCX (x) in that case). Therefore, if we write V ⊥(x) = v](x)−V (x) for
the projection of v](x) on the normal cone NCX (x) to X at x, Moreau’s decompo-
sition theorem and the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality yield
〈v](x), z〉x = 〈V (x) + V ⊥(x), z〉x = 〈V (x), z〉x ≤ ‖V (x)‖x‖z‖x, (B.4)
for all z ∈ TCX (x), with the inequality binding if and only if z ∝ V (x). We thus
obtain the characterization
‖V (x)‖x = max{〈v](x), z〉x : z ∈ TCX (x) ∩B(x)}, (B.5)
where B(x) = {z ∈ RA : ‖z‖x ≤ 1}.
Note now that the correspondence x 7→ TCX (x) is l.s.c. because it is constant on
the interior of each face of X and TCX (x) ⊆ TCX (y) whenever supp(x) ⊆ supp(y).
This shows that the constraint correspondence x 7→ TCX (x)∩U(x) of (B.5) is l.s.c.;
since the objective function 〈v](x), z〉x of (B.5) is jointly continuous in x and z, a
precursor to the maximum theorem (Aliprantis and Border, 1999, Lemma 16.30)
implies that x 7→ ‖V (x)‖x is itself l.s.c., as claimed. 
Appendix C. Additional proofs
In this appendix, we collect certain proofs that would have otherwise disrupted
the flow of the main text. We begin with Proposition 3.9 on the continuous exten-
sion of inner products to the boundary of X :
Proof of Proposition 3.9. Fix some x ∈ K and write g](x) = Q>ΛQ where the di-
agonal matrix Λ consists of the eigenvalues of g](x) and Q is an orthogonal matrix
(Q> = Q−1) whose columns are the eigenvectors of g](x). Since g](x) is positive-
semidefinite, its eigenvalues are non-negative. Furthermore, since dom g(x) =
im g](x), every eigenvector of a nonzero eigenvalue of g](x) must lie in dom g(x):
indeed, if g](x)z = λz for some λ > 0, we will also have z = g](x)zλ−1, i.e.
z ∈ im g](x) = dom g(x). As a result, we may write g](x) = ∑λ>0 λuλu>λ where
the summation is taken over all positive eigenvalues λ > 0 of g](x) (assumed for
convenience to be distinct) and uλ is the corresponding column of Q. The metric
tensor of the induced scalar product 〈·, ·〉x at x is then defined as the pseudoinverse
(g](x))+ of g(x) (cf. Appendix A), given here by
(g](x))+ =
∑
λ>0
λ−1uλu>λ . (C.1)
Our continuity and uniqueness claims are then immediate.
Finally, to show that g]αβ(x) = 0 if α /∈ supp(x) and g is minimal-rank extend-
able, simply note that g]αβ(x) = e
>
α g
](x)eβ =
∑
λ λ e
>
αuλu
>
λ eβ = 0 because all
eigenvectors of g](x) with positive eigenvalues lie in Rsupp(x) = dom g(x). 
42 P. MERTIKOPOULOS AND W. H. SANDHOLM
We now proceed with the proof of Proposition 5.2 regarding the existence and
uniqueness of solutions to (RmD). As noted in the main text, we only need to
prove part (ii), which concerns the case of full-rank extendable metrics. Existence
of forward solutions of (RmD) on X follows from general results of Aubin and
Cellina (1984) on solutions to discontinuous differential equations; see Lahkar and
Sandholm (2008) for a summary of their argument. It remains to show that forward
solutions to (RmD) from each initial condition in X are unique. This conclusion
follows from Lemma C.1 below, where V (x) = Πx(v](x)) denotes the right-hand
side of (RmD):
Lemma C.1. Let x(t) and x′(t) be solutions to (RmD), and let
P (t) = ‖x′(t)− x(t)‖2x(t) e−λt. (C.2)
If λ > 0 is large enough, then P (t) is nonincreasing.
Given this lemma, we immediately obtain:
Proof of Proposition 5.2. Let x(t) and x′(t) be solutions of (RmD) with x(0) =
x′(0). We then get P (t) = P (0) = 0 for all t ≥ 0, so x(t) = x′(t) for all t ≥ 0. 
To prove Lemma C.1, we need one final auxiliary result, showing that V satisfies
a one-sided Lipschitz condition with respect to the underlying metric:
Lemma C.2. There exists a KV > 0 such that
〈V (x′)− V (x), x′ − x〉x ≤ KV ‖x′ − x‖2x for all x, x′ ∈ X . (C.3)
Proof of Lemma C.2. Write w(x) = v](x) and w⊥(x) = w(x)−Πx(w(x)), and recall
that since g is full-rank extendable, Πx is the orthogonal projection onto TCX (x)
with respect to 〈·, ·〉x. We thus obtain
〈V (x′)− V (x), x′ − x〉x = 〈w(x′)− w(x), x′ − x〉x − 〈w⊥(x′)− w⊥(x), x′ − x〉x
= 〈w(x′)− w(x), x′ − x〉x + 〈w⊥(x), x′ − x〉x + 〈w⊥(x′), x− x′〉x′
+ (w⊥(x′))>(g(x′)− g(x))(x′ − x)
≤ Kw‖x′ − x‖2x + (w⊥(x′))>(g(x′)− g(x))(x′ − x), (C.4)
where the bound for the first term in the last line from the Cauchy-Schwarz in-
equality and the Lipschitz continuity of w, and the rest follows from Moreau’s de-
composition theorem. To bound the last term, write gα(x) for the α-th row of g(x),
let W⊥max = maxα∈Amaxx∈X w⊥α (x), and let ‖·‖2 denote the standard Euclidean
norm. Then, if C > 0 is chosen sufficiently large, we get
(w⊥(x′))>(g(x′)− g(x))(x′ − x)
≤
∑
α∈A w
⊥
α (x
′)‖gα(x′)− gα(x)‖2‖x′ − x‖2
≤W⊥max‖x′ − x‖2
∑
α∈A‖gα(x
′)− gα(x)‖2 ≤W⊥maxC‖x′ − x‖2x. (C.5)
In the above, the first inequality is an immediate corollary of the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality; the last one follows from the equivalence of norms on RA and the fact
that g is C1 on X ; finally, C can be chosen independently of x and x′ because X is
compact. Thus, combining (C.4) and (C.5) completes our proof. 
With Lemma C.2, we finally obtain:
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Proof of Lemma C.1. Define g˙(x) = (g˙αβ(x))α,β∈A by g˙αβ(x) = 〈dgαβ(x)|V (x)〉 =∑
κ∈A Vκ(x) ∂κgαβ(x), and let Kg = maxα,β∈Amaxx∈X g˙αβ(x) < ∞ (recall that g
is C1). Then, for all t ≥ 0 such that x(t) and x′(t) are differentiable, we have
P˙ = 2〈V (x′)− V (x), x′ − x〉x e−λt + (x′ − x)>g˙(x)(x′ − x) e−λt − λ‖x′ − x‖2x e−λt
≤ −(λ− 2KV −Kg) ‖x′ − x‖2x e−λt, (C.6)
where we used Lemma C.1 to bound the second term in the first line. Taking
λ > 2KV + Kg then yields P˙ ≤ 0; since x(t) and x′(t) are absolutely continuous,
we conclude that P (t) is nondecreasing. 
We close this appendix with the proof of our permanence criterion:
Proof of Proposition 6.9. Define P : K → R as P (x) = − exp (∑α pαDh(eα, x))
for x ∈ K◦ and P (x) = 0 for x ∈ bd(K). The steepness of h implies that P is
continuous, while Proposition 6.3 implies that ddt log(P (x)) = Ψ(x) ≡ 〈v(x)|p− x〉
for x ∈ X ◦. Hence, by Theorem 12.2.1 of Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998), it suffices
to show that the function Ψ is an average Lyapunov function for (HD), meaning
that, for every initial condition x(0) ∈ bd(X ), there is a t > 0 such that
1
t
∫ t
0
Ψ(x(s)) ds > 0. (C.7)
We proceed by induction on the cardinality of the support of the initial condition.
The claim is trivial if this cardinality is 1. For the inductive step, suppose that (C.7)
holds when the cardinality is k ∈ {1, . . . , |A|− 2}, and consider an initial condition
x(0) whose support A′ has cardinality k+1. If x(t) converges to the boundary of the
face X ′ of X spanned by A′, then our claim follows from the inductive hypothesis
and the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 12.2.2 in Hofbauer and Sigmund
(1998). If instead x(t) does not converge to the boundary of X ′, then there exists
a δ > 0 and an increasing sequence of times tn ↗ ∞ with xα(tn) ≥ δ > 0 for all
α ∈ A′. Then, letting x¯α(t) = t−1
∫ t
0
xα(s) ds and u¯(t) = t−1
∫ t
0
〈v(x(s))|x(s)〉 ds,
we may assume (by descending to a subsequence of tn if necessary) that x¯(tn) and
u¯(tn) converge to some x¯∗ and u¯∗ respectively as n→∞.
We now claim that vα(x¯∗) = u¯∗ for all α ∈ A′, implying that x¯∗ is a restricted
equilibrium of G. Indeed, let yα(t) = Dh(eα, x(t)) for all α ∈ A′. Then y˙α =
〈v(x)|x〉 − vα(x) by Proposition 6.3, so the linearity of v(x) in x implies that
1
t
∫ t
0
〈v(x(s))|x(s)〉 ds− vα(x¯(t)) = yα(t)− yα(0)
t
. (C.8)
Given that x(tn) remains a minimal positive distance away from bd(X ′), it follows
that yα(tn) is bounded from above for all α ∈ A′. Therefore, the right hand side
of (C.8) vanishes as tn → ∞, implying in turn that vα(x¯∗) = u¯∗ for all α ∈ A′, as
claimed.
Now, since x¯∗ is a restricted equilibrium of G, Proposition 5.4 implies that it is a
boundary rest point of (HD), so u¯∗ = 〈v(x¯∗)|x¯∗〉 < 〈v(x¯∗)|p〉 by (6.14). Moreover,
since Ψ(x) = 〈v(x)|p− x〉, setting t = tn in (C.7) yields
t−1n
∫ tn
0
Ψ(x(s)) ds = t−1n
∫ tn
0
〈v(x(s))|p− x(s)〉 ds = 〈v(x¯(tn))|p〉 − u¯(tn) (C.9)
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so limn→∞ t−1n
∫ tn
0
Ψ(x(s)) ds = 〈v(x¯∗)|p〉− u¯∗ > 0. This establishes (C.7) for large
enough t = tn, completing our proof. 
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